



AUTUMN MANOEUVRES

IN HAMPSHIRE,

1891.

REPORT ON THE MANŒUVRES IN HAMPSHIRE, IN SEPTEMBER, 1891.

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V. ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES.

1. SUPPLY.

Aldershot being treated as the base, Divisional Depots were established at East Meon and Soberton, with an intermediate rest camp at Bordon.

FLOUR.—This was bought at Bishop's Waltham, in the district, and the purchase being completed three days before the export of rye from Russia was prohibited, the "best Household" was obtained at 28/6, or 11d. per sack less than we pay at Aldershot for "London No. 2," the market value of which is 3/0 per sack less than "best Household." The bread was good. For the first three days the ovens had scarcely sufficient bottom heat. In future, where the bakery is on wet clay, the ovens should be burnt for a week before baking is commenced.

MEAT.—Beef was supplied by the Aldershot contractor who, after some negotiation, supplied the camps at the Aldershot prices; this lost us the opportunity of training the Army Service Corps Officers to purchase. The quality of the meat left nothing to be desired, all the beef being English, except one lot of Canadian. I have been urged to purchase in the district; the cost would be rather more, which need not, however, be considered, if the gain were adequate, but as Manœuvres can only take place in sparsely populated districts, I apprehend that the advantage would fall to some middleman, as sufficient cattle could not be obtained locally. It would probably have been better if a central butchery had been established in the vicinity of Warnford, about half way between the camps.

OATS.—Oats were purchased in the London markets at the market rates, the bulk being black Swedes at 40 lbs. to the bushel, the balance being thin-skinned white Russians at 41 lbs.

It has been recommended that the oats should be purchased in the district, but the remark made in paragraph on Meat applies in this case. There will be no substantial advantage to the farmers unless the oats grown in the district are purchased, and this is not possible in the sparsely cultivated districts where only Manœuvres can be held by permission of farmers. At the Manœuvres in 1890 some farmers endeavoured to sell us oats bought in the London market, and for us to have made such purchases would not have been an advantage to the district.

HAY.—Hay was purchased at the average of £3 9s. 7d. per ton. I consider the quality was generally good, although, from want of storage and owing to the necessity of collecting it a considerable period in advance, many trusses were mouldy. This applied in a lesser degree to some of the oats.

One Lieutenant-Colonel of Artillery and one squadron leader condemn the hay unreservedly, and state that it was not only in many cases mouldy, but that generally it was poor in quality. As, however, the damaged hay, together with all the trusses rejected as mouldy was bought by farmers near Soberton for £2 per ton, and near East Meon for more than its original cost, I think that the farmers' estimate of the hay was probably more accurate than that of the two officers who have not been through a course of instruction in judging the quality of supplies. All undamaged surplus hay was carted into Aldershot.

FIREWOOD.—This was purchased in the district, the average price being 8s. 8d. per ton.

2. RATIONS AND THEIR PREPARATION.

The quality of the rations was so good that no ration boards were held in one Division after the first day.

FIELD KITCHENS.—It is desirable in future that greater uniformity in the arrangements of the kitchens should be enforced.

Amongst the battalions of the Aldershot Division two used field kitchens constructed according to Regulations and Instructions for Encampments, page 37. Two battalions used their kettles to form a trench as directed in page 38. Seven battalions used gratings which were generally of the following dimensions, 5-ft. by 4-ft. by 1-ft., weighing about 50lbs. and costing 12s. per set, one set of gratings being required for every 100 men; they are made to fold up and pack fairly close, but as the extra weight would amount to between four and five hundred lbs. per battalion, their use on field columns or manœuvres should be forbidden, since they could not be carried on service. The present service camp kettle, supplemented by the mess tin or canteen lid, provides sufficient means for cooking purposes in the field.

The arrangements for the messing and cooking in the field were not satisfactory. Owing to the inexperience of regiments there was occasionally a delay in obtaining the dinners after coming into camp. I recommend that the supervision of the arrangements of this nature be made the special duty of the second in command both in camp and quarters.

It is worthy of consideration, if, as I recommend, a free grocery ration is supplied during the Manœuvres, whether cocoa should not occasionally be substituted for coffee.

FUEL.—The present allowance of 3lbs. per man is ample, and although I do not recommend any diminution, it is certain that the whole of it is seldom expended.

MESSING.—The diet of the different battalions varied considerably. One battalion had stews every day, the serjeant cook stating he could not obtain flour to give the men pies. Four battalions gave no extras at breakfast; the other battalions gave either butter, cheese, or tinned meat. The Mounted Infantry had a hot meat breakfast daily, by taking one-fourth of the ration meat for that purpose, under the following system:—Half the men of each company had half a pound of ration meat, the other half having bacon, liver, &c., and on the following day the arrangement was reversed. This left every man with three

quarters of a pound of meat for dinner. Butter, cheese, &c. time. It appears that except in one battalion, enough dried meat was issued for puddings.

BEAN.—There was, as usual, considerable waste, and British soldiers until the daily ration of it is issued to them.

Some Commanding Officers complained that when the bread ration should have been issued overnight. There making such an arrangement had any commanding officer tendency in our service to lean too much on the Supply Department.

GROCERIES AND VEGETABLES.—Groceries were supplied by the Aldershot contractor.

Some of the corps had no vegetables on the day. The time has come when we should approximate our system to the conditions of service in the field. The vegetables, to be provided, under regimental arrangements, that separate contracts. It is obvious that this is not a good plan, vegetables but that milk be provided by Government.

Great care must, however, be taken that good rules, for contractors were able to supply the groceries at a price charged by Government. This point requires immediate attention.

I recommend that paragraph 17, Allowance Regulation, be supplied at cost price, unless, indeed, the issue is made from the Aldershot depot.

ISSUES.—The instructions contained in paragraph 1 of the Instructions for the Supply Department, dated 1st September, 1891 (Appendix H), were scarcely ever carried out, and the Supply officers deserve great credit for the 36 hours' notice, and the Supply officers deserve great credit for the 36 hours' notice, and the Supply officers deserve great credit for the 36 hours' notice.

Some Commanding Officers have represented that issues, but this arose mainly from the late receipt of regiments.

SPECIAL FREE ISSUES FROM CANTERIES.—During the Manœuvres the men, although ordered to be supplied with only one biscuit. I gave instructions that a more adequate supply was great diversity of treatment in this respect. In some cases during the 16 days on every 100 men, and in another corps being £5 12s. 8d. We recognize that horses require more time has come to admit the same argument for the men.

Officers in command be allowed to provide what extras, if absolutely necessary, at Government expense, up to a limit. It is estimated it will not cost more than 1½d. per day only when the larger forces are opposing each other.

been about £300.

3. TRANSPORT.

HORSES.—This work, always heavy, has been this inclement weather and heavy roads. At the commencement of the Manœuvres the Army Service Corps had 80,000 lbs. reserve of oats economized, which enabled the transport horses to be rationed up to their work.

Some of the horses fell off greatly in the first instance of experience on the part of some officers, as in other cases retained their condition.

Nearly all the Army Service Corps transport battalions the Officers Commanding Royal Artillery and returning camp equipment and local duties at Aldershot.

The Royal Artillery also provided transport for the termination of the Manœuvres.

The conduct of the Army Service Corps leaves nothing to be desired. They have been doing even more work than they would have been able to do if they had been better than the spirit that they have shown throughout.

4. ORDNANCE STORE DEPARTMENT.

EQUIPMENT.—In order to economise transport, Ordnance Stores were issued some time in advance, viz., on the 20th July at East Meon for a Division at each place, and also rest camps at Bordon and the difficulties of the department were still further increased by the Division to the camps of their adversaries after the termination of the Manœuvres.

Two sets of camp equipment, each for over 6,000 men, were issued. This change of camps adds greatly to the value of the equipment, but it is obvious that it increases the work of the Ordnance Store Department.

It necessitated the sending out of 2576 tents and 4 representing a total value of £35,000 if new. Possibly, from not formulated properly, but the capacity of the Senior Ordnance Store fact that only one bale of 25 blankets remained undrawn while all demands were met.

REPORT ON AUTUMN MANŒUVRES, 1891.

ALDERSHOT, 20TH NOVEMBER, 1891.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

In order to facilitate arrangements for a repetition of Autumn Manœuvres, I commence my report on those held this year by detailing briefly the numerous preliminary steps which were necessarily undertaken to obtain the use of the land.

I. PRELIMINARY ARRANGEMENTS.

1. SELECTION OF GROUND.

During the Autumn of 1890 I examined ground between Basingstoke and Alresford, but abandoned the idea of its use, owing to a scarcity of water and the number of woods on the high ground lying between those two points.

At the close of the year I communicated with Sir Nelson Rycroft, Bart., of Kempshot Park, Basingstoke, whose son, Captain W. H. Rycroft, 7th Dragoon Guards, surveyed the country lying between Wolverton on the North, and Oakley and Whitechurch on the South.

After a careful inspection of the ground, I asked permission of the landlords to communicate with their tenants (Appendix A).

My request for use of the land was received in a most generous spirit by landowners and farming tenants on the North side of the district. The Earl of Carnarvon gave permission for the encampment in his park of 6000 men, who would have been necessarily placed close to the woods in which pheasants are reared, whilst on the South side Mr. Portal placed at my disposal land on which his dairy cattle are fed. However, after several visits to the ground and personal interviews with the shooting tenants, I found it impossible to overcome their objections, and was reluctantly obliged to abandon the scheme.

In the meantime a Staff Officer had examined the country in the vicinity of Petersfield, which had the serious disadvantage of scarcity of water and an absence of suitable encamping grounds. These difficulties induced me to look over some ground in North Hampshire, and after similar preliminary steps had been undertaken, selection was made of a suitable tract lying between Stockbridge and Winchester. Here, however, again the interests of shooting tenants prevented our arrangements being completed. It must, I think, now be taken for granted that Manœuvres without an Act of Parliament are not possible where the sporting rights are leased to persons residing out of the district. Eventually the ground about Petersfield was selected, subject to my obtaining leave from all the landowners and occupiers.

On the 1st December, 1890, I asked permission for the assembly of two Divisions of Infantry with a proportion of other arms, which was approved on the 28th January, 1891.

2. ARRANGEMENTS WITH OCCUPIERS.

Letters similar to that shown in Appendix A were sent to the seven largest landowners, and subsequently a Staff Officer visited all the occupiers concerned.

Some difficulty was experienced throughout the Manœuvres owing to our finding it impossible to obtain a representative committee of occupiers, although we received great assistance from Mr. Bonham Carter, Major Woods, Captain Le Roy Lewis, and others. All our propositions, however, were accepted in a cordial spirit by owners and occupiers.

On the 6th May I rode over the ground and selected the approximate positions of the camps, and on the 9th June I reported to you on the area for the proposed Manœuvres.

Several communications were received towards the end of August, pointing out that owing to the unusually inclement weather harvest operations had been materially delayed and suggesting that the Manœuvres should be put off to a later date. Some persons went so far as to propose the end of September.

On the 3rd September I again visited the ground, and decided that the Manœuvres should be put off until the 10th September, or about 10 days later than would have been necessary in an ordinary season.

3. MAPS.

700 Manœuvre Maps were specially prepared by the Ordnance Survey Department (see Appendix B). These were issued to the troops and a 6-in. Ordnance map was given to the Generals of Divisions. The 2-in. map had 100ft. contours marked on it, and was apparently enlarged from the 1-in. I imagine the process would be more troublesome, but the result might be more satisfactory, if the 2-in. maps were reduced from the 6-in.; nevertheless the map answered well and gave general satisfaction. Although there were not many names in this sparsely occupied country, yet spots could generally be identified by the numbers indicating the contours. There were one or two minor errors, for example "Hockham," near East Meon, is not known locally by that name. It would have been better if the difference between the 1st class and 2nd class roads could have been more clearly shown.

All the maps were mounted on linen except 14th, which were prepared on paper, and five on specially prepared tough paper. There is a general agreement of opinion that in spite of the

linen map becoming indistinct from wet and folding (which may also affect the accuracy of the scale), yet they are the most suitable for regimental officers, while for General and Staff Officers the best map is the paper one cut into squares and mounted on linen.

4. ASSEMBLY AND INSPECTION OF THE DIVISIONS.

On the 1st September two Infantry Divisions having been formed (with the exception of one Battalion of the Grenadier Guards coming from Ireland and one Field Battery at Hilsea), they were inspected on the 2nd by His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief, dressed and equipped as they were intended to march.

Five-and-a-half Battalions had joined the command towards the end of August, and the opportunity was taken of causing them to work out tactical schemes during the time they were compulsorily delayed at Aldershot, so as to place them on more even terms with the troops stationed here.

II. DESCRIPTION OF THE MANŒUVRE GROUND AND CAMPS.

1. GROUND.

My unsuccessful efforts to obtain the use of ground in the North of Hampshire were prolonged, because it was evident from the first that difficulties would be experienced as regards camps in the Meon District, and although the weather was unusually severe, yet even with ordinary weather, difficulties must always be anticipated on similar geological formations.

The ground over which we were permitted to work is bounded on the North by the road from East Meon to West Meon, on the West by the river Meon, on the South by the road from Brockbridge, North of Windmill Down, to Clanfield, and on the East by the South-Western Railway. Its area is seven miles from East to West by five miles from North to South. (See Map, Appendix B).

One dominant ridge, generally 400 feet above the river Meon, runs in a North-Westerly and South-Easterly direction through three parts of the area to Tegdown, where the ridge turns sharply to the North-East, its culminating point being nearly 600 feet higher than East Meon.

When the ground was first examined it was feared that this ridge might prove unfavourable to all tactical schemes, since scouts could look down from it into either camp, but the plan of placing the summit of the ridge out of bounds, except during the actual operations, obviated difficulty on this point.

The Camp on the Eastern side of the ground should, if possible, for tactical reasons, have been placed near Buriton, but as the Meon river, which rises one mile South of the village of East Meon, is the only water supply available for the district, it was necessary to place the camp for one Division there, while the other Division was placed at Soberton, about $6\frac{1}{2}$ miles distant by the track over the Downs; and 10 miles down stream following the course of the river.

The choice of camping ground at East Meon was further restricted to the left bank of the river, where there were a few meadows, the fields on the right bank being under cultivation, with crops in many cases still standing when the Manœuvres were terminated.

One narrow lane ran through the proposed site for the camp and was generally below the fields on either side, which were for the most part small and not well adapted for camps. In the more elevated fields the slopes were too steep for men or horses to rest, and in the lower fields the surface was too flat to allow of the water running off; indeed it was within two feet of the surface.

The Camp at Soberton left little or nothing to be desired so far as the Head-Quarters of the Division and one Brigade were concerned, but it was necessary to place the 2nd Brigade either on arable land and stubble fields or to remove it 2000 yards from the water. This last alternative was adopted.

The Mounted Infantry was encamped in an arable field, which, like those at East Meon, became a sea of mud after three days' heavy rain.

The Head-Quarter Camp of the Umpire-in-Chief was placed at West Meon, nearly equidistant between the two Divisions. The principal Staff Officers lived in a private house, which was hired at their own expense, for the fortnight. There can be no question that such an arrangement, which prevails on the Continent and which, although not at present sanctioned by regulation, is what would be done on service, is most conducive to the public interest.

2. WATER SUPPLY.

The water supply within the area of the Manœuvres was dependent on the river Meon, the supply from which was sufficient and of good quality.

East Meon—It was necessary to arrange for drinking water to be pumped into the water carts on the road at some little distance from the stream; a plentiful supply for horses was obtained by pumping into troughs from a leat close to the road. Water for washing was arranged for by troughs in one of the fields between the camp and the river.

West Meon—The water supply was a comparatively simple matter, and met all requirements, except for bathing, for which there were no facilities at either camp.

Soberton—Here the water supply was well arranged so far as the power of obtaining such existed, but both the drinking water and the water for washing had to be delivered to the camps by carts and stored in tanks; the horses were watered near the stream.

At Soberton hill camp, on account of the distance to the water, a rectangular tank capable of holding 5000 gallons was dug out and lined with tarpaulin. This answered well, but in

future should it become necessary to draw water through which all water should be drawn, greater convenience to the troops, and to the tank drier.

The supply in the tank at Soberton was water for which was stored separately in the Stanhope lines, Aldershot.

I am not satisfied that the arrangements have been sufficient if the hot weather of the summer in England there should be facilities for the troops to camps, whether standing or otherwise.

I am of opinion, from the experience of the last year, that the Engineers as to deserve special attention.

The experience gained last year was issued for latrines and urinals, but for the screens were not properly placed and screens. In future, poles should be provided.

In one Division, although the camps were made to save the ground from being used, the 16th of September, the ground was used.

Special precautions should be taken to keep clean, as from want of practice this should be provided by the troops from badges, they should be issued on requisition.

Whenever it can be arranged the entrance and exit staked and corded, field.

A Divisional Depot for 6000 men square the field is the more convenient.

As the Army Service Corps is the being under canvas for three months, attention should be given in selecting the best.

III. THE MARCH (TO AND FROM THE MANŒUVRE GROUND)

The Divisions marched from Aldershot to Soberton and East Meon in the Division, in which owing mainly to one very hot day from being marched, orders laid down clearly that the 100 yards distance was to be preserved, ever the force was not in the immediate proximity of the water.

The number of men falling out to ensure proper attention being paid to feet. During the march to the Manœuvres 11½ per cent. in one battalion to one averaging 2½. Another way of putting it is that the march was not a success. I apprehend insufficient attention to feet, 1889, and stricter discipline is needed.

In some cases great pains had to be taken, and in marching to Meon only one practised marching in Marching Order.

I do not wish, however, to imply of this battalion informed me that, several men who had not fallen out, influence kept these men in the ranks.

I refer to this subject under the heading of casualties, must be expected and therefore become soft; and it must be medically inspected before leaving. Various causes unfit to march.

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future should it become necessary to thus store water a pump should be fitted to the tank through which all water should be drawn. By such an arrangement there would be less waste, greater convenience to the troops, and the water would be kept cleaner and the ground round the tank drier.

The supply in the tank at Soberton hill was not used for cooking or drinking purposes, water for which was stored separately in tanks brought from the buildings now being constructed in the Stanhope lines, Aldershot.

I am not satisfied that the arrangements I made for the supply of water would have been sufficient if the hot weather of the first three days had continued. During Manœuvres in England there should be facilities for the men to wash not only their feet but their bodies.

I am of opinion, from the experience gained at these Manœuvres, that the water supply to camps, whether standing or otherwise, is so important a feature in the duties of the Royal Engineers as to deserve special attention.

3. SANITATION.

The experience gained last year was not fully utilized in all respects. More screens were issued for latrines and urinals, but for want of proper instruction beforehand the trenches in the screens were not properly placed and in consequence men urinated against the walls of the screens. In future, poles should be provided for all latrines.

In one Division, although the camp was surrounded by hedges, no adequate arrangements were made to save the ground from being polluted, and when the Divisions changed camps on the 16th of September, the ground was left by this Division in a very dirty state.

Special precautions should be taken to ensure that the camps occupied by Volunteers are kept clean, as from want of practice this is not generally done.

The issue of brooms is essential to the due conservancy of a camp. On service they would be provided by the troops from hedges, brushwood, &c., but as this is not feasible in England they should be issued on requisition.

4. SUPPLY DEPOT.

Whenever it can be arranged these should be situated close to a main road, with an entrance and exit staked and corded, the Depot of the Army Service Corps being in the same field.

A Divisional Depot for 6000 men requires at least six acres, and the more nearly square the field is the more convenient it will be.

As the Army Service Corps is the first to move out and the last to come in, in this case being under canvas for three months against a fortnight for the troops, great consideration should be given in selecting the best camping ground for it.

III. THE MARCH (TO AND FRO BETWEEN ALDERSHOT AND THE MANŒUVRE GROUND).

1. INFANTRY.

The Divisions marched from Aldershot on the 7th and 8th September, respectively, and reached Soberton and East Meon in good order, with the exception of a portion of one Division, in which owing mainly to want of experience of field service the men suffered one very hot day from being marched in too close order, and also from badly fitted boots. The orders laid down clearly that the boots were to be previously carefully inspected and that 100 yards distance was to be preserved between battalions, and 10 yards between companies whenever the force was not in the immediate vicinity of the enemy. These orders were not properly carried out in this Division.

The number of men falling out varied in proportion to the care taken by the officers to ensure proper attention being paid to the fitting of boots and socks and the cleanliness of the feet. During the march to the Manœuvre ground the numbers of men who fell out ranged from $11\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. in one battalion to one man in 750 in another battalion, the total per-centage averaging $2\frac{1}{4}$. Another way of putting this is—that 73 fell out in one battalion to one in another. I apprehend insufficient attention was given to Part V. (II.) Route Marching, Infantry Drill, 1889, and stricter discipline is necessary in this respect.

In some cases great pains had been taken before the Manœuvres to harden the men's feet, and in marching to Meon only one or two men fell out in one battalion which had previously practised marching in Marching Order (the men carrying 38lbs. besides clothes).

I do not wish, however, to imply that the men did not suffer, for the Commanding Officer of this battalion informed me that, on making an inspection, he found the soles of the feet of several men who had not fallen out were quite raw. Pride in the Regiment and the Captains' influence kept these men in the ranks.

I refer to this subject under the heading of "Boots," but on the earlier days of operations such casualties must be expected amongst men who are not at regular duty and whose feet therefore become soft; and it must, moreover, be borne in mind, that as the men were not medically inspected before leaving Aldershot, there were many in the ranks who were from various causes unfit to march.

In some corps there is a tendency, especially in rifle battalions and light infantry, to exceed the prescribed rate of marching. This practice should be rigidly repressed and the rate should be frequently verified by an officer with a watch at the rear of the column. The length of pace should also be tested. The practice was tried of marching bands in the centre

of battalions and it answered so well that I recommend it should be enforced, the band being placed in the centre and the drums in front of the battalion, reversing their positions on alternate days. During the march back, one Division covered the distance of 19 miles with practically no one falling out of the ranks, the men marching not only cheerily but very well. It must, however, be remembered that on the advice of the General Officers and Principal Medical Officers the men did not wear valises.

MILITARY CHIROPODISTS.—Some Commanding Officers are in favour of a certain number of men in every battalion or corps being instructed as chiropodists, as the neglect of corns swells the list of men who fall out on the march. I recommend the experiment be tried.

2. HORSE ARTILLERY.

A Horse Artillery Brigade Division of two Batteries, and the Mounted Infantry (strength 350 officers and men), were ordered to leave Aldershot on the 14th September, at such an hour as would bring them to West Meon at 6 a.m. on that day, in time to take part in an operation which was to commence at 8 a.m.

The march of the Artillery from Aldershot to West Meon (23½ miles), and thence after the tactical operations to Soberton, was no test, as one battery with the service equipment of 12-pounder B.L. guns carried no ammunition, and the other battery was supplied with a lighter experimental equipment and lighter 12-pounder B.L. guns. The hope that the trial would bring to light the capabilities of each battery was, therefore, not fulfilled. The work during the operations on this day was also very easy on the horses.

3. MOUNTED INFANTRY.

The same march, made by the Mounted Infantry, reflected great credit on the officer in command. There were 8 casualties, and although the efficiency of the horses would be even greater with more knowledge on the part of some of the officers, yet considering their short mounted service, and the fact that the majority of the men had only been mounted for a very short time, the result is very creditable to the officer in command and all those serving under him.

4. TRANSPORT.

The system of moving the transport of each Brigade immediately behind its troops should be abandoned, as horses walk faster than men and are kept continually starting and stopping, causing the shoulders and necks to be rubbed and leaving no time for feeding.

In future, I propose to march all the transport in one column in rear of the Infantry. This, with proper arrangements at the start, should not cause any appreciable delay in the arrival of the baggage.

5. REGIMENTAL TRANSPORT.

Two battalions, the 1st Durham Light Infantry and the Grenadier Guards, both outside the normal strength at Aldershot, had no regimental transport on charge.

In future manœuvres it will be better that the usual proportion of regimental transport should be attached to similarly situated battalions from the Army Service Corps, with drivers complete. This will save trouble, correspondence, and many requisitions.

IV. REMARKS ON THE CONDUCT OF THE OPERATIONS.

1. PROGRAMME.

During the Manœuvres of the Infantry Columns at Woolmer in 1890, and in previous years, all the schemes were made out by the Umpire-in-Chief. It was thought this year that owing to the higher rank of the officers and the practice enjoyed by many of them in setting schemes and in acting as Chief Umpires, it might be well to decentralize and leave a part of the instruction in their hands.

The programme, therefore, issued on the 5th September (Appendix C) placed on the General Officers commanding the two Divisions the duty of instructing those under them for six out of the twelve days available for the Manœuvres.

The general result of this attempt at decentralizing the instruction was very satisfactory, although the teaching varied according to the experience of the officers in command; owing probably to the want of practice in setting schemes they did not always induce a collision, and in some cases the men were under arms for longer periods than upon the days when the Divisions were opposed. This should be prevented in future.

The schemes given by me were issued overnight to the commanders of the two opposing sides, who were instructed that they were not to be shown to anyone but their senior Staff Officer until half-an-hour before starting from camp for the points of assembly on the day of the operations (see order Appendix D).

The question of giving troops an occasional rest day other than Sunday was debated, and it was decided it would be undesirable to leave any day wholly unoccupied. I recommend that this decision be adhered to for the future.

2. VALUE OF OPERATIONS IN A STRANGE COUNTRY.

Advantage was taken of the experience gained at the Cavalry Manœuvres in 1891, and Officers were prohibited from riding over the Manœuvre ground when not engaged in the operations. This, together with the imposing of a neutral zone, half-a-mile broad, over which parties from either camp might not pass, added greatly to the interest and value of the instruction.

Although the additional labour of the Ordnance Store Department is very great, yet the system of the Divisions exchanging camps at the end of the first week is well worth the extra trouble imposed.

3. DISTINGUISHING DRESS.

On the 2nd day of the Manœuvres, owing to the heat of the helmets, from which some confusion resulted. I endeavoured to procure locally some calico, strips of which were worn on the left shoulder, factory, and I recommend a proposal made by Lieutenant-Colonel Duke of Connaught, that we should assimilate our practice Army, by putting white cap covers on the head-dress of our difficulty with those corps which have white helmets, but this those generally employed.

The expense would not be great, as the covers will weather in England being seldom sufficiently hot to incur propose to purchase calico and to have it made up into helmets a cost of £60. I estimate this will suffice for 7000 men.

In my report of the Cavalry Manœuvres, dated the 25th, the cocked hat should be abolished for Manœuvres, and I ask for future. Every Staff Officer when coming under fire this walked about bareheaded, because opposing troops were in officer with this too conspicuous head-dress.

4. INFANTRY.

The most noticeable point in the Infantry during the Manœuvres was in fire discipline, and in the skill of the company officers. There was a much more correct appreciation of ground and its place than last year, and briefly it may be asserted with careful "Company Field Training" was very apparent.

OFFICERS' CHARGERS.—It is worthy of consideration whether officers' chargers should not be from 14-2 to 15-2. Horses of this price. They thrive better on a small allowance of forage, and the facility of mounting and dismounting than animals 16 hands high.

5. ARTILLERY.

I laid down that this arm was not to be employed in detail, generally answered well.

The orders given as to the verification of ranges were of one Division and were not acted on in either Division, and obtain much useful instruction.

In several instances batteries were pushed forward so that the exits from such were free from the enemy. The Artillery was sufficiently supervised by those under whom they were serving orders such as "Take up the best position you can," or, "The Artillery of one Division took up its first position within 15 minutes. The batteries of the Divisions occasionally came into position in detail, the other and with such independent action that on service in detail.

Artillery fire must be concentrated and directed by those expected to successfully attack Infantry which has not been and whose Artillery has not been at least temporarily put out.

On the 12th September, the officer commanding one battery of his Artillery on low ground, 210 feet under a steep hill driven back no instruction was apparently sent to assist the line of retreat. In consequence he attempted to ascend the hill, that although three of the guns reached the summit yet they were so delayed that the enemy's Infantry arrived within 50 yards of the summit. Thus the battery must have been captured. The fact that the battery was not captured until the conclusion of the Manœuvres was a very important point in this movement was the skill of the officers in the good driving of the men. The three teams ascended 212 feet, traversed being 632 yards. I watched the horses as they ascended and in my opinion this quarter-of-an-hour's work took more out of the horses than any other work done during the Manœuvres.

The Cordite blank cartridge being made up of 150 pieces of Cordite, it was very untidy. It will probably be necessary when manœuvring to make some arrangement for clearing it up. There is little smoke from the Cordite. The smoke from the service charge of the same is very much more in volume.

6. CAVALRY (DIVISIONAL SQUADRON).

The scouting did not quite satisfy me, bearing in mind that the Cavalry had been at Aldershot for two drill seasons, and had done a great deal of Cavalry Drills and Manœuvres.

As a rule messages were sent back only when the enemy was sighted. It seems scarcely to have appreciated the importance to a General of knowing that the enemy had not been sighted.

so well that I recommend it should be enforced, the band the drums in front of the battalion, reversing their positions the march back, one Division covered the distance of 19 miles out of the ranks, the men marching not only cheerily but very numbered that on the advice of the General Officers and Principal wear valises.

Some Commanding Officers are in favour of a certain number of ps being instructed as chiropodists, as the neglect of corns swells the march. I recommend the experiment be tried.

2. HORSE ARTILLERY.

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3. DISTINGUISHING DRESS.

On the 2nd day of the Manœuvres, owing to the heat of the sun, both opposing forces wore helmets, from which some confusion resulted. I endeavoured to rectify this by purchasing locally some calico, strips of which were worn on the left shoulder. The effect was not quite satisfactory, and I recommend a proposal made by Lieutenant-General His Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught, that we should assimilate our practice to that adopted in the German Army, by putting white cap covers on the head-dress of one side. There will remain the difficulty with those corps which have white helmets, but this affects a small number only of those generally employed.

The expense would not be great, as the covers will be required for Infantry only, the weather in England being seldom sufficiently hot to inconvenience seriously mounted men. I propose to purchase calico and to have it made up into helmet covers by next drill season at a cost of £60. I estimate this will suffice for 7000 men.

In my report of the Cavalry Manœuvres, dated the 25th October, 1890, I recommended that the cocked hat should be abolished for Manœuvres, and I ask permission to carry this out for the future. Every Staff Officer when coming under fire this year removed his cocked hat and walked about bareheaded, because opposing troops were invariably directed to fire upon any officer with this too conspicuous head-dress.

4. INFANTRY.

The most noticeable point in the Infantry during the Manœuvres was the great improvement in fire discipline, and in the skill of the company officers in handling their commands. There was a much more correct appreciation of ground and its bearing on the operations taking place than last year, and briefly it may be asserted with confidence that the advantage of careful "Company Field Training" was very apparent.

OFFICERS' CHARGERS.—It is worthy of consideration whether the limit of height of Infantry officers' chargers should not be from 14-2 to 15-2. Horses of this size can be obtained at a lower price. They thrive better on a small allowance of forage, and are much more suitable from the facility of mounting and dismounting than animals 16 hands high, which are now often used.

5. ARTILLERY.

I laid down that this arm was not to be employed as a rule over 2500 yards. This generally answered well.

The orders given as to the verification of ranges were not transmitted to the batteries of one Division and were not acted on in either Division, and the consequence was a failure to obtain much useful instruction.

In several instances batteries were pushed forward up lanes before it was ascertained that the exits from such were free from the enemy. The Artillery officers were not generally sufficiently supervised by those under whom they were serving. In many instances they received orders such as "Take up the best position you can," or, "Conform." On one occasion the Artillery of one Division took up its first position within 500 yards of unshaken Infantry. The batteries of the Divisions occasionally came into position at such long distances the one from the other and with such independent action that on service they might have been destroyed in detail.

Artillery fire must be concentrated and directed by one will. Infantry should not be expected to successfully attack Infantry which has not been temporarily shaken by Artillery, and whose Artillery has not been at least temporarily put out of action.

On the 12th September, the officer commanding one of the opposing forces placed one battery of his Artillery on low ground, 210 feet under a steep hill, and when the force was driven back no instruction was apparently sent to assist the battery commander in regaining the line of retreat. In consequence he attempted to ascend the hill with a gradient so steep, that although three of the guns reached the summit yet the fourth stuck fast, and all of them were so delayed that the enemy's Infantry arrived within 500 yards before half the hill was surmounted. Thus the battery must have been captured. The ammunition wagons, which could not breast the hill, were left below until the conclusion of the operations. The only satisfactory point in this movement was the skill of the officers in leading on the easiest gradient and the good driving of the men. The three teams ascended 212 feet in 410 yards, the total distance traversed being 632 yards. I watched the horses as they were going home and am of opinion this quarter-of-an-hour's work took more out of them than a long day's march.

The Cordite blank cartridge being made up of 150 pieces of brown paper makes the ground very untidy. It will probably be necessary when manœuvring on private property to make some arrangement for clearing it up. There is little smoke from this cartridge and it is soon dissipated. The smoke from the service charge of the same substance will, however, be greater in volume.

6. CAVALRY (DIVISIONAL SQUADRONS).

The scouting did not quite satisfy me, bearing in mind that the squadrons employed had been at Aldershot for two drill seasons, and had during that time taken part in two Cavalry Drills and Manœuvres.

As a rule messages were sent back only when the enemy was visible. The squadron leaders seem scarcely to have appreciated the importance to a General of negative information, that is that the enemy had not been sighted.

There was a tendency to dismount to employ fire action when Infantry was available in the immediate vicinity of the squadron. This arose from the want of practice in officers of all arms of working in conjunction with arms other than that to which they belong.

In one Division the mistake was made of ordering a squadron leader not to fight on any account, and acting on these orders he allowed a company belonging to his force to be surrounded without an effort to extricate it. These orders I was obliged to cancel.

7. ROYAL ENGINEERS.

The good work carried out by the Field Companies and Telegraph Battalion, Royal Engineers, is detailed under another part of this report. Sections of the Companies were employed on several occasions to mark entrenchments, but the most important tactical work of the Royal Engineers, that of preparing an entrenched position which had been proposed for the 19th September, was necessarily abandoned owing to the rain.

8. BALLOON SECTION.

The country was not favourable for the use of balloons, and yet their utility is undoubted when one force stands on the defensive, and the experience gained fully repaid the cost of taking a balloon down with the troops, although the Manœuvres were terminated prematurely.

The force of wind prevented its ascent on two occasions and on another day the operations were cut short by a dense fog. The average strength of the wind at the ground level on the summit of the hills was about 12 miles an hour. It is assumed that when it is more than 20 miles an hour, i.e., the equivalent of a "gentle breeze," the motion of the car will be too great to permit of useful observations.

It was found by experience and confirmed by experiment that as the force of the wind over the crest of the ridge was always considerably greater than elsewhere, it answered better to make the ascent from the valleys even with the disadvantage of paying out more rope.

If balloons are to be at the disposal of Commanders for manœuvres there should be one with each of two opposing forces, as the advantage they give is great.

9. YEOMANRY AND VOLUNTEERS.

The Officer Commanding Hampshire Yeomanry asked permission on 28th July for his Regiment to take part in the Manœuvres for a week and such arrangement was sanctioned by Horse Guards War Office letter of 8th August. The Commanding Officer accounts for the small muster (40) owing to the retarded harvest operations. The Officers of the Regiment, two of whom were attached to my Staff, are in many cases landowners and the men are occupiers of land. They helped materially, not only in rendering the Manœuvres possible by facilitating the arrangements for the use of the land, but also in minimizing claims for damages.

Five shillings per diem for every mounted man was paid to the Officer Commanding. Camp equipment was also supplied.

The 1st Volunteer Battalion of the Hampshire Regiment also received authority to take part in the Manœuvres for a week and brought 698 officers and men at one time, but this number varied from day to day.

10. ALL ARMS.

Prior to the Manœuvres officers were directed to study carefully the "Rules for the Conduct of Field Manœuvres," and a recapitulation was placed before them on the 5th September (see Appendix C). of the mistakes which had been noticed most frequently at Aldershot during the last two years. The result showed that much trouble had been taken to master the subject and to avoid similar errors. The failing most apparent is that of officers considering only the branch of the service to which they belong. Many officers have not sufficient confidence to give decided orders to the other arms of the service; thus officers of the same force were observed working in the immediate vicinity but independently of each other. Commanders of units neither asked for nor gave information to other units operating near them. Infantry when joining Artillery in action seldom or never enquired as to the range.

When attacking strong positions it was observed that sufficient reconnaissances were not made, that time was not given for the action of Artillery fire, and that the Staff did not direct the general movement.

The study of the Umpire Rules caused, however, all combatants to appreciate and accept unhesitatingly the decision of Umpires and to conform to them with less demur than I have hitherto seen.

11. UMPIRE STAFF.

It has been suggested to me, and I think with reason, that it would be well if the Umpire-in-Chief saw the Umpires for a few minutes before the conference, since officers do not like criticizing the actions of their superiors before an assembly of other officers. This preliminary conference would enable the Umpire-in-Chief to elicit points which afford useful instruction and are now sometimes not brought out from the hesitation of Umpires to remark on the conduct of their superiors. The reports by the Senior Umpires on a day's operation should be received by the Umpire-in-Chief within three hours of the termination of the operation. It is of the greatest importance to get the criticism published without any delay.

In selecting Umpires it is desirable as far as possible to choose officers who have been recently serving with troops. When officers of the Head-Quarter Staff are employed, if they have been some time away from their corps they should attend at least half-a-dozen of the tactical days at Aldershot prior to being detailed for this duty.

12. CASUALTIES DURING TACTICAL

In order to deal with the difficulty of stragglers numerous during the progress of an Infantry fight, orders practice measures to meet such cases (see Appendix E).

In many instances, however, the Umpires forgot to piece of paper (see form attached Appendix F) specifying arose in the case of units placed out of action during a retreat the rear of the force to which they belonged without cause.

I concur with the views of some Umpires that troops by being placed out of action for more than half-an-hour troops to remain for five minutes on the spot in order the result, I think it would be better, in the absence of which should be given when necessary, that at the command have piled arms, the Cavalry have dismounted, or Artillery they should all go to the rear of their respective forces, and the mounted branches at a walk.

13. SOME OF THE ERRORS OBSERVED

Some of the schemes assigned far too extended occupation, and similarly in attacking the position, the

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SIGNALLERS.—One of the faults was that signals and this fault occurs during nearly every tactical day some instruction on this point should be given to the School of Signalling. This remark has been passed to

14. AMMUNITION

Owing to the early termination of the Manœuvres much less than I anticipated.

R.A. 12lb. B.L.	...
Magazine Rifle	...
Martini-Henry Rifle	...
Cavalry & Royal Engineer	...
Machine gun	...

Great pains were taken to economise the ammunition. September, 1891, a maximum of ten rounds per man for field day was allowed. I think I was unduly apprehensive have been better to have fixed the maximum at 15 rounds although useful as a means of instruction has the disadvantage false.

The time has arrived when smokeless powder Artillery, so that some judgment may be formed of As the Continental nations have now had it under trial nothing else, I think an effort should be made to issue field training of the companies, and that sufficient ammunition arms at all field days in 1892.

The small allowance of ammunition we are Manœuvres gives but little instruction in practising urged to place some limit within which neither side be taken forward. I am loath to suggest any restriction practice on service, and thus give an excuse for not sometimes possible. I think the difficulty may be met when necessary, the ammunition supply out of action Rules, para. 18.

As one or more rounds of ball ammunition was is certain that the certificate hitherto rendered (Appendix effective, and I propose to add to it the words "That

15. MARCH

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and I think with reason, that it would be well if the Umpire-in-Chief, before the conference, since officers do not like criticisms before an assembly of other officers. This preliminary conference-in-Chief to elicit points which afford useful instruction and from the hesitation of Umpires to remark on the conduct of their Manœuvres on a day's operation should be received by the Staff of the termination of the operation. It is of the greatest importance that the Umpire-in-Chief should be detailed for this duty.

12. CASUALTIES DURING TACTICAL OPERATIONS.

In order to deal with the difficulty of stragglers who in recent wars have become very numerous during the progress of an Infantry fight, orders were given on the 5th September to practice measures to meet such cases (see Appendix E).

In many instances, however, the Umpires forgot to give the units placed out of action the piece of paper (see form attached Appendix F) specifying the time, and considerable difficulty arose in the case of units placed out of action during a retirement as they could not readily regain the rear of the force to which they belonged without causing confusion.

I concur with the views of some Umpires that troops as a rule should not lose instruction by being placed out of action for more than half-an-hour, and although it is necessary for all troops to remain for five minutes on the spot in order that their adversaries may take notice of the result, I think it would be better, in the absence of specific instructions from the Umpire, which should be given when necessary, that at the conclusion of five minutes after the Infantry have piled arms, the Cavalry have dismounted, or Artillery have limbered up to the front, that they should all go to the rear of their respective forces, Infantry marching with reversed arms, and the mounted branches at a walk.

13. SOME OF THE ERRORS OBSERVED DURING THE OPERATIONS.

Some of the schemes assigned far too extended a position for the force available for its occupation, and similarly in attacking the position, the attacking force was often unduly extended.

Occasionally sufficient thought was not given to the orders contained in the Special Ideas. For example, an officer on the 15th September being ordered to march and attack the enemy vigorously, in spite of the fact that he was aware the enemy was only a rear-guard, elected to make a turning movement instead, and thus gave the rear-guard time to escape.

There was occasionally a tendency on the part of officers who have not been employed with large forces to act in a manner which would not have been attempted in war.

SIGNALLERS.—One of the faults was that signals on both sides were read by the opponents, and this fault occurs during nearly every tactical day at Aldershot. It might be well that some instruction on this point should be given to the classes while they are being taught at the School of Signalling. This remark has been passed to the officer concerned.

14. AMMUNITION.

Owing to the early termination of the Manœuvres the expenditure of ammunition was much less than I anticipated.

R.A. 12lb. B.L. ...	28 rounds per gun.
Magazine Rifle ...	12.5 per man.
Martini-Henry Rifle ...	15 "
Cavalry & Royal Engineers ...	13 "
Machine gun ...	100 per gun.

Great pains were taken to economise the ammunition, and in the orders issued on the 1st September, 1891, a maximum of ten rounds per man for a Divisional and five rounds for a Brigade field day was allowed. I think I was unduly apprehensive of the expenditure, and it would have been better to have fixed the maximum at 15 rounds per man, as the husbanding of ammunition although useful as a means of instruction has the disadvantage also of occasionally rendering it false.

The time has arrived when smokeless powder should be issued both to Infantry and Artillery, so that some judgment may be formed of any changes which may be required in tactics. As the Continental nations have now had it under trial for two years, and this year were using nothing else, I think an effort should be made to issue sufficient by the 1st February, 1892, for the field training of the companies, and that sufficient should be issued by 1st May for the use of all arms at all field days in 1892.

The small allowance of ammunition we are able, for economical reasons, to expend at Manœuvres gives but little instruction in practising the supply to the firing line. I have been urged to place some limit within which neither small arm ammunition carts nor mules may be taken forward. I am loath to suggest any such limitation, fearing it may grow into a practice on service, and thus give an excuse for not getting up ammunition as close as may be sometimes possible. I think the difficulty may be best met by instructing the Umpires to rule, when necessary, the ammunition supply out of action. This I propose to add to the Umpire Rules, para. 18.

As one or more rounds of ball ammunition were picked up on the field of exercise it is certain that the certificate hitherto rendered (Appendix G), although stringent, is not sufficiently effective, and I propose to add to it the words "That an officer felt at the bottom of every pouch."

15. MARCH PAST.

The Right Honorable the Earl of Northbrook, G.C.S.I., Lord Lieutenant of Hampshire, to whom I wrote, consented and attended to take the salute at the March Past, which, in order to ensure the presence of the Hants Yeomanry and Volunteer Battalion, had been arranged to take place on the 19th September. Unfortunately the weather was too unfavourable for the parade.

ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES.

1. SUPPLY.

ated as the base, Divisional Depots were established at East Meon and immediate rest camp at Bordon.

bought at Bishop's Waltham, in the district, and the purchase being the export of rye from Russia was prohibited, the "best Household" 11d. per sack less than we pay at Aldershot for "London No. 2," the 3/0 per sack less than "best Household." The bread was good. For ns had scarcely sufficient bottom heat. In future, where the bakery should be burnt for a week before baking is commenced.

supplied by the Aldershot contractor who, after some negotiation, Aldershot prices; this lost us the opportunity of training the Army purchase. The quality of the meat left nothing to be desired, all the beef of Canadian. I have been urged to purchase in the district; the cost need not, however, be considered, if the gain were adequate, but as place in sparsely populated districts, I apprehend that the advantage man, as sufficient cattle could not be obtained locally. It would of a central butchery had been established in the vicinity of Warnford, camps.

urchased in the London markets at the market rates, the bulk being the busbel, the balance being thin-skinned white Russians at 41 lbs. ended that the oats should be purchased in the district, but the Meat applies in this case. There will be no substantial advantage is grown in the district are purchased, and this is not possible in some farmers endeavoured to sell us oats bought in the London made such purchases would not have been an advantage to the

ased at the average of £3 9s. 7d. per ton. I consider the quality, from want of storage and owing to the necessity of collecting it a e, many trusses were mouldy. This applied in a lesser degree

of Artillery and one squadron leader condemn the hay unreservedly, in many cases mouldy, but that generally it was poor in quality. y, together with all the trusses rejected as mouldy was bought £2 per ton, and near East Meon for more than its original cost, I ate of the hay was probably more accurate than that of the two through a course of instruction in judging the quality of supplies. e carted into Aldershot.

urchased in the district, the average price being 8s. 8d. per ton.

TIONS AND THEIR PREPARATION.

ns was so good that no ration boards were held in one Division

desirable in future that greater uniformity in the arrangements

of the Aldershot Division two used field kitchens constructed Instructions for Encampments, page 37. Two battalions used as directed in page 38. Seven battalions used gratings which dimensions, 5-ft. by 4-ft. by 1-ft., weighing about 50lbs. and gratings being required for every 100 men; they are made to at as the extra weight would amount to between four and their use on field columns or manoeuvres should be forbidden, on service. The present service camp kettle, supplemented provides sufficient means for cooking purposes in the field.

messing and cooking in the field were not satisfactory. Owing there was occasionally a delay in obtaining the dinners after that the supervision of the arrangements of this nature be and in command both in camp and quarters.

on, if, as I recommend, a free grocery ration is supplied during should not occasionally be substituted for coffee.

nce of 3lbs. per man is ample, and although I do not recommend the whole of it is seldom expended.

e different battalions varied considerably. One battalion at cook stating he could not obtain flour to give the men extras at breakfast; the other battalions gave either butter, anted Infantry had a hot meat breakfast daily, by taking or that purpose, under the following system:—Half the pound of ration meat, the other half having bacon, liver, arrangement was reversed. This left every man with three

quarters of a pound of meat for dinner. Butter, cheese, or dripping was given daily at tea time. It appears that except in one battalion, enough dripping was saved to provide a free issue for puddings.

BREAD.—There was, as usual, considerable waste, and this is I apprehend inevitable with British soldiers until the daily ration of it is issued to them in two portions.

Some Commanding Officers complained that when the Divisions changed camps half the bread ration should have been issued overnight. There would have been no difficulty in making such an arrangement had any commanding officers made the request. There is a tendency in our service to lean too much on the Supply department.

GROCERIES AND VEGETABLES.—Groceries were supplied from the Reserve Depot.

Some of the corps had no vegetables on the day they marched into camp, and I think the time has come when we should approximate our system in field columns and manoeuvres to the conditions of service in the field. The vegetables, as usual, were provided, or supposed to be provided, under regimental arrangements, that is 28 different units were making separate contracts. It is obvious that this is not a good plan, and I recommend that not only vegetables but that milk be provided by Government.

Great care must, however, be taken that good supplies are issued at reasonable rates, for contractors were able to supply the groceries at a halfpenny per ration less than the price charged by Government. This point requires immediate attention.

I recommend that paragraph 17, Allowance Regulations, be altered, and that groceries be supplied at cost price, unless, indeed, the issue is made free during Manoeuvres.

INDENTS.—The instructions contained in paragraph 13, of Aldershot Divisional Orders of 1st September, 1891 (Appendix H), were scarcely ever carried out in the Divisions as regards the 36 hours' notice, and the Supply officers deserve great credit for furnishing rations at short notice.

Some Commanding Officers have represented that there was a delay in making the issues, but this arose mainly from the late receipt of regimental indents.

SPECIAL FREE ISSUES FROM CANTEENS.—During the first days of the Manoeuvres in some battalions the men, although ordered to be supplied with something from the canteen, received only one biscuit. I gave instructions that a more adequate supply should be issued, but there was great diversity of treatment in this respect. In some corps as much as £8 was expended during the 16 days on every 100 men, and in another corps as little as £2. The general average being £5 12s. 8d. We recognize that horses require more food in camp than in stables. The time has come to admit the same argument for the men, and I recommend that the General Officer in command be allowed to provide what extras, in addition to $\frac{1}{4}$ lb. of meat, he thinks are absolutely necessary, at Government expense, up to a certain sum to be authorised beforehand. It is estimated it will not cost more than 1½d. per man per diem, it being given on days only when the larger forces are opposing each other. This year the amount would have been about £300.

3. TRANSPORT.

HORSES.—This work, always heavy, has been this year exceptionally so, owing to the inclement weather and heavy roads. At the commencement of the preparations the Army Service Corps had 80,000 lbs. reserve of oats economised during the preceding winter months, which enabled the transport horses to be rationed up to 18 lbs. of oats per diem, according to their work.

Some of the horses fell off greatly in the first instance, but this is attributable to the want of experience on the part of some officers, as in other companies doing more work the horses retained their condition.

Nearly all the Army Service Corps transport having been taken out with the two Divisions the Officers Commanding Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers supplied teams for returning camp equipment and local duties at Aldershot between the 7th and 22nd September.

The Royal Artillery also provided transport for clearing Bordon and Whitehill on the termination of the Manoeuvres.

The conduct of the Army Service Corps leaves nothing to be desired. For three months they have been doing even more work than they would have to do on active service, and nothing could be better than the spirit that they have shown throughout.

4. ORDNANCE STORE DEPARTMENT.

EQUIPMENT.—In order to economise transport, Ordnance Store Depots had to be formed some time in advance, viz., on the 20th July at East Meon, and on the 5th August at Soberton, for a Division at each place, and also rest camps at Bordon and Whitehill each for a Brigade, and the difficulties of the department were still further enhanced by the changing over of the Divisions to the camps of their adversaries after the first week, with the additional difficulty of the varying strength of corps.

Two sets of camp equipment, each for over 6,000 men, had to be transferred the same morning. This change of camps adds greatly to the value of the tactical instruction afforded to the troops, but it is obvious that it increases the work and responsibility of the Ordnance Store Department.

It necessitated the sending out of 2576 tents and 44,000 blankets, and other equipment, representing a total value of £35,000 if new. Possibly, from want of practice, the demands were not formulated properly, but the capacity of the Senior Ordnance Store Officer is shown by the fact that only one bale of 25 blankets remained undrawn at Soberton, and none at East Meon, while all demands were met.

Last year more stores than absolutely required were transported to Berkshire, but this error was avoided in the recent Manœuvres.

I invite attention to the Regulations for the scale of Camp Equipment for Field Service. It is too limited for Peace Manœuvres. On the other hand, the standing camp scale is far too large. I submit a scale (Appendix I) which, if approved, I shall issue as the Aldershot Manœuvre scale. That some decided scale of this nature is necessary is shown by the fact that of the six Field Batteries taking part in the Manœuvres not two demanded on the same form, and no two batteries demanded on the same scale. This would have been obviated if the demand had been put forward by the Officer commanding the Brigade Division.

At one camp, when the Division marched out all the units attempted to hand back their stores at the same moment. This will probably result in some expense to the troops, which might have been avoided by better Divisional arrangements.

The Senior Ordnance Store Officer has drawn my attention to the fact that soldiers do not know how tents should be packed and put into the valises. I propose to add an instruction on this point to the field training of companies.

The experience gained at the Manœuvres showed that I might have made better arrangements for the equipment issued to the Army Service Corps employed on convoys. This will be obviated in future years.

It is worthy of consideration whether it will not be an economy during Peace Manœuvres to have special tents for the reception of stores, as the hospital marquee hitherto used for this purpose is not suitable. If my suggestion is approved, I am prepared to submit a proposal for the construction of one which will save money for the public. If this is not approved the hiring of a barn would, I think, be advantageous for storing of camp equipment, when it can be done.

Regulations supplied by the War Office were sent down as they are originally printed in 1890, and not being up to date were practically useless.

I am reporting separately, in a confidential paper, on the officers employed in the department, who all worked with the greatest energy and good will. Ordnance Store duties cannot however, be learnt in a few months, and our difficulties were increased by the fact that the aggregate service in the department of the five officers employed under the Senior Ordnance Store Officer amounted only to 36 months.

5. PAY OF TROOPS.

Officers commanding units, acting under the advice of the Station Paymaster at Aldershot, took with them as a rule £25 in silver, while Canteen Presidents took about £25 in bronze. Arrangements were made with the local bank at Petersfield to cash cheques as required.

The system of paying companies of battalions weekly, but on different days, enabled much less cash to be taken than would otherwise have been essential, as it was found that a great part of the money circulated through the canteen, and the president of the canteen was generally able to hand to the Captain of C company a considerable part of what he paid to A company two days previously. I recommend that in future we should trust less to canteens and brewers, and that each battalion should be allowed transport for a safe, the weight of which should be fixed.

6. FIELD TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES.

Early in August a line was run from Aldershot to Bordon for convenience of the Service in forming Depots at that place. At the end of the month the 1st Division Telegraph Battalion proceeded to West Meon, laying a line via White hill to that place and also to East Meon, Sober-ton, and Hambledon. The Hambledon line was in communication with the Postal System.

On the 7th and 8th September, telephone exchanges were established in each of the respective camps and on the 15th a telegraph line was laid between West Meon and the Yeomanry camp at Exton; in all a total of 57 miles.

On the 4th, 16th, and 18th September, special lines were erected up to the actual zone of operations, and the movements of the troops were reported back into camp. Two officers were told off for the purpose of reporting, while a third remained in camp to follow the operations on a map; this was useful as a practice, but I do not, for the present, suggest its possibility in war.

The Director of Army Telegraphs considers that the office work was severe, and advocates a wider circulation of the advantages of the Telegraph Battalion being made among the Post Office servants in order to induce a greater number of trained telegraphists to enlist.

The Telephone Exchanges were much used during the Manœuvres and reduced considerably the work of orderlies.

The Press messages were sent by correspondents to Petersfield to be forwarded by rail. The instruments in use in the Military Offices do not transmit messages as quickly as the Post Office fast speed instruments, and the supply of operators was limited.

7. POST OFFICE.

In one Division a Post Office was established with a sorter furnished by the Post Office at Petersfield. Two non-commissioned officers assisted the Post Office official. The expenses of the non-commissioned officers were guaranteed by the Post Office. The arrangements worked well, and such are necessary in these days of parcel post, and where postal dues must be collected.

8. CYCLISTS.

The question of establishing a permanent section of corps is well worthy of consideration. Cyclist orderlies were Cavalry Manœuvres of 1890, as they were during the Cavalry recent Autumn Manœuvres, when their services were invaluable. Wear and tear and exposure of horses, as the cyclist can be kept close at hand and gets away sooner. He delivers messages orderly and can move in frosty weather when a horse cannot move heavy loads, however, he is useless.

The pace would improve if men were permanently employed. There would be less damage to machines. Probably the best machine has been introduced. To save clothing, of which there is a shortage, should be given cord pantaloons and stockings.

Two of the battalions which marched into Aldershot brought cyclist sections composed mainly of non-commissioned officers. In a battalion there were 6 color-serjeants and serjeants out of commissioned officers and men riding on machines that will be as in most other innovations the means have hitherto been found. Having mounted the riders out of regimental funds.

If the system is to be officially recognized it will be one of the maker's shops so that after being instructed, he can execute repairs which at present are unnecessarily troublesome.

9. PRINTING.

The hektograph did not answer owing to the damp weather. A small printing press is recommended for the use of each Division. The place of letterpress printing at Army Head-Quarters in the future.

VI. EQUIPMENT AND CLOTHING.

1. OFFICERS' EQUIPMENT.

During the Manœuvres the articles of equipment carried were in nearly all battalions. Some carried capes, some great-coats, while others carried nothing except a sword, and the majority of battalions and probably will do so until a General Order is issued. Uniformity is to lay down what the officers shall carry in the future.

In my opinion for manœuvres the mounted officer should carry field-glasses over the left shoulder and haversack over the right. Bottle and cape or great-coat. Company officers should carry straps to waist-belt in centre of back to be worn when marching over the right shoulder, field-glasses and waterbottle over the left shoulder. Field-glass as to size and case should be laid down.

It is generally agreed that the long boot worn by the Infantry officer should be discarded. The Infantry officer should regard the parade, but show parades. The Infantry officer should regard the fight, as once he comes under fire he cannot remain in the ranks.

In many regiments which come here it is necessary to wear boots which is common indeed in the service. The boots are getting something to look smarter than a gaiter, but they get hard and cracks. I think the balance of advantage is in favor of both mounted and company, wearing shooting boots, put on over the gaiters.

2. KERSEY FROCKS AND TROUSERS.

These are, I think, sufficiently good if they were made properly. Every regiment which comes to Aldershot has its clothes. Of last year's drill season I noticed one of the best battalions. I caused it to be inspected and the trousers were found that over 50 per cent. of the trousers had been taken in the furlough season. Greater pains should be taken to make them worthy of consideration whether we should not treat them as working and walking out dress. This might be done.

3. BOOTS.

The boot as issued would be good enough if the shape of the man's foot. Once the boot is in possession, used, the heel which should be kept low and broad is many cases repairs are very badly carried out. The boots makes the leather inelastic and hard. Sold on account of the loss of appearance. In many instances with boots with the almost invariable result that after can be seen protruding over the point of the boot. They have a fish oil worked into them by hand, and boot condition a week before a march, and during the last daily.

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The Division marched out all the units attempted to hand back their kit. This will probably result in some expense to the troops, which better Divisional arrangements.

A Store Officer has drawn my attention to the fact that soldiers do not pack and put into the valises. I propose to add an instruction on packing of companies.

At the Manœuvres showed that I might have made better arrangements issued to the Army Service Corps employed on convoys. This

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8. CYCLISTS.

The question of establishing a permanent section of cyclists for orderly duty in every corps is well worthy of consideration. Cyclist orderlies were found very useful during the Cavalry Manœuvres of 1890, as they were during the Cavalry Drills of 1891, and again in the recent Autumn Manœuvres, when their services were invaluable. Their employment saves wear and tear and exposure of horses, as the cyclist can be kept under cover; he can also be kept close at hand and gets away sooner. He delivers messages quicker than a mounted orderly and can move in frosty weather when a horse cannot well do so. In hilly country, with heavy lanes, however, he is useless.

The pace would improve if men were permanently employed on the duty and there would be less damage to machines. Probably the best machine for military purposes has not yet been introduced. To save clothing, of which there is considerable wear and tear, the cyclist should be given cord pantaloons and stockings.

Two of the battalions which marched into Aldershot to take part in the Manœuvres brought cyclist sections composed mainly of non-commissioned officers. In the section of one battalion there were 6 color-serjeants and serjeants out of 10 men. The practice of the non-commissioned officers and men riding on machines that will not carry a rifle should be forbidden. As in most other innovations the means have hitherto been found by voluntary efforts, battalions having mounted the riders out of regimental funds.

If the system is to be officially recognized it will be desirable to send an armourer to one of the maker's shops so that after being instructed, he may himself instruct the riders in executing repairs which at present are unnecessarily troublesome and costly of execution.

9. PRINTING.

The hektograph did not answer owing to the damp weather. Either type writers or a small printing press is recommended for the use of each Division. Type writers cannot take the place of letterpress printing at Army Head-Quarters in the field.

VI. EQUIPMENT AND CLOTHING.

1. OFFICERS' EQUIPMENT.

During the Manœuvres the articles of equipment and clothing carried by officers differed in nearly all battalions. Some carried capes, some great-coats, some haversacks and field-glasses, while others carried nothing except a sword, and the mode of carrying articles varied even in battalions and probably will do so until a General Order is issued. The first step towards ensuring uniformity is to lay down what the officers shall carry in peace and in war.

In my opinion for manœuvres the mounted officer should carry a sword on his waistbelt, with field-glasses over the left shoulder and haversack over the right shoulder, and on his saddle a water-bottle and cape or great-coat. Company officers should carry sword, rolled cape attached by two straps to waist-belt in centre of back to be worn when men carry great-coats or capes, haversack over the right shoulder, field-glasses and waterbottle over the left shoulder. A sealed pattern field-glass as to size and case should be laid down.

It is generally agreed that the long boot worn by Infantry officers is not suitable for any but show parades. The Infantry officer should regard his horse as a means of conveyance only to the fight, as once he comes under fire he cannot remain effective when in the saddle.

In many regiments which come here it is necessary to forbid the practice of wearing field boots which is common indeed in the service. These are, I believe, a compromise towards getting something to look smarter than a gaiter, but the part around the ankle after a time gets hard and cracks. I think the balance of advantages is in favour of all Infantry officers, both mounted and company, wearing shooting boots, pantaloons, and putties.

2. KERSEY FROCKS AND TROUSERS FOR MEN.

These are, I think, sufficiently good if they were not altered after they leave Pimlico. Every regiment which comes to Aldershot has its clothing made too tight. At the conclusion of last year's drill season I noticed one of the best battalions here with trousers very tight at the knees. I caused it to be inspected and the trousers compared with the sealed pattern, ascertaining that over 50 per cent. of the trousers had been taken in at the knees after the commencement of the furlough season. Greater pains should be taken to check such alterations of clothing. It is worthy of consideration whether we should not treat the Infantry like the Cavalry who have a working and walking out dress. This might be done by keeping the tunic for the latter use.

3. BOOTS.

The boot as issued would be good enough if the sole were not so rigid, as it does not come to the shape of the man's foot. Once the boot is in possession of the soldier, it is in too many cases mis-used, the heel which should be kept low and broad is replaced by a high and small one, and in many cases repairs are very badly carried out. The practice, moreover, of constantly blacking the boots makes the leather inelastic and hard. Soldiers are very averse to dubbing their boots, on account of the loss of appearance. In many instances the men are allowed to fit themselves with boots with the almost invariable result that after a few days wear the great toe of the man can be seen protruding over the point of the boot. To soften the leather of boots they should have a fish oil worked into them by hand, and boots intended for wear should be put into good condition a week before a march, and during the last week before a march they should be worn daily.

4. SHIRTS.

I have noticed that many of the men of battalions who join the command wear linen or cotton shirts. This should be forbidden, but will never be checked until in the Army, as in the Navy, it is laid down that officers are to see frequently the underclothing of their men on parades.

5. SOCKS.

We have received a new pattern sock, the seam of which is brought to the side of the heels. I have not yet got the official report, but it is much liked and will probably help to reduce the number of sore feet. As compared with the previous pattern these socks protect the feet better, they fit better, and do not slip down around the ankle. It has been suggested that they last better if they are soaked in water before being worn.

6. HELMETS.

The difficulties of obtaining a sightly head covering which shall give sufficient protection from sun and rain, and allow the soldier to fire when in marching order in the prone position, has not yet been overcome, and I fear it cannot be accomplished. It might be better to let the soldier have in England a show helmet, giving him a sun helmet when he goes abroad. It is obvious that the several different patterns for the Colonies and India which exist cannot be necessary. One pattern for warm climates is sufficient. The soldier never walks out in a helmet for pleasure, as no helmet which is made in large numbers can ever be as comfortable as a cap. I am myself content, for service purposes, with the Morion shaped one brought forward last year by an officer of the Head-Quarter Staff, which enables the Infantry soldier to shoot or a gunner to lay a gun by a Scott's sight.

The round cap worn by the Infantry (Guards) is not serviceable; the Officer Commanding the only battalion that wore it reports that his men's caps are completely ruined, and he thinks there is scarcely one cap fit for wear on parade, although the Manœuvres lasted only 16 days for the battalion.

7. WATER-BOTTLES.

The order that the bottles should be filled and inspected every morning before the troops left camp was in many instance disobeyed. This should receive attention in future.

8. SHOEING.

The shoes being made of very soft material, wore quickly, and were very thin, and many broke in half. Horses were as a rule shod before going to the Manœuvres, and one pair of shoes was carried for each horse, but this was not sufficient for even a fortnight.

The nature of the soil caused many to be lost. One squadron lost 29 shoes, the Field Artillery with about three times the strength, only lost 24, which indicates that something also is due to careless shoeing-smiths. The Artillery had, however, only 50 sets of machine made shoes.

After the return march to Aldershot it was found that many horses of one of the Divisional squadrons were suffering from bruised feet. This squadron had only been employed for 13 days, mainly on turf and over cultivated land.

Unless we can ensure better than we have done that the machine made shoes shall be of fair quality, I should like to reconsider my recommendation made last year that 50 per cent. should be shod with them.

9. REMARKS ON EXPERIMENTAL EQUIPMENT.

WATER BOTTLES—(LEWES PATTERN).—These are of two kinds, one iron enamelled the other tin, both fitted with a filter which in a short time gets rusty and useless, and in addition the arrangement is too elaborate to be suitable for troops. The tin pattern soils the men's clothing and the enamel on the iron one soon chips. (BOYES' PATTERN AND NEW PATTERN IRON ENAMELLED).—Both these bottles are favourably regarded, the iron being covered with felt. As the reports on these two, which differ only in their shape, were equal, I have had the bottles passed to other corps for further comparison and report, which is to be rendered on the 1st January, 1892.

WATER TROUGHS—(MOLYNEUX-SEEL).—These form a useful addition to the water cart, enabling water-bottles to be quickly filled and preventing waste of water.

DRINKING CUP.—I caused a drinking cup to be attached by a chain to each cart. This is convenient and prevents the waste of water incurred by the men holding their mouths down to the tap hole.

ENTRENCHING TOOLS (WOODGATE).—These were tried for carriage. The combined carriage of pick and bayonet and of spade and bayonet is not satisfactory, but when carried singly they are easier for the men than the Wallace tool. Some slight alterations are now being made to raise the carriage higher than the hips, and a further trial will be carried out.

AXES—PICK AND FELLING (HOGAN'S COMBINED).—I recommend the adoption of this tool for pioneers. The weight of the axe head gives greater force when the tool is used as a pick and similarly the weight in the pick allows of a more powerful stroke with the axe.

HEAD COLLARS (STUD ATTACHMENTS).—These were used by the Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers, and Army Service Corps, but are approved of by the Royal Artillery only. I cannot recommend their adoption, believing there is nothing so serviceable as a strap and buckle, for all stud holes fray out.

FROG SWORD SADDLE (MARK II).—The Mark II. is an improvement on the Mark I. It should be slightly wider, while the stud should be lower and should be made of a different material.

HOOF PICKERS.—I recommend their being carried on the horse. They are so seldom used except to remove tan when the horse is shod that it seems scarcely worth while to put them on the men's boots.

TRACE HOOKS (EXPERIMENTAL).—These are certainly an improvement on the present pattern. Spare rubber rings should be taken on service to replace worn ones.

HORSE COLLARS—(STEEL).—There can be no question that the steel collar is the best for Army Service Corps work. They make so much noise that the links and, what for want of a better name I must call them, the rings, are not in their present form for fighting units.

SWIVELS PILING (MAGAZINE RIFLE).—The piling swivels are an improvement on the present pattern.

LIGHTENING LOAD OF CAVALRY HORSE.—With the view of reducing the weight put on the Cavalry horse, as laid down in the Manual for Field Artillery, vol. IV., pages 56-57, I obtained sanction for the following articles being carried in forage carts, of which two were allotted to each squadron.

	lbs.	ozs.	
Corn sack ...	1	13	Drawers
Picketing gear ...	3	4	Socks
Ankle boots ...	3	13	Towel
Horse brush ...	0	11	Holdall
Clothes brush ...	0	4	Housewife
Stable sponge ...	0	1	Pad for saddle
Oil bottle ...	0	4	Spare pants
Pot of grease ...	1	1 $\frac{3}{4}$	Putties
Pocket ledger ...	0	2	Cape
Spare boot laces ...	0	2	Forage net
Service cap ...	0	1 $\frac{3}{4}$	Waterproof
Flannel shirt... ..	1	1	

The experiment answered well. The officers who carried the forage cart on it.

It was, however, brought to notice that the forage cart is a sort of work. It is too short in the body, causing the load to readjustment frequently becomes necessary on the march.

I think a light four-wheeled wagon is better adapted for the vehicle, in spite of the danger that once we get to four wheels there is risk of overloading.

The four-wheeled wagon is more easily packed and does not require the attention which is essential with the forage cart, and which I do not think is a hurry of packing up on service. Moreover, the load of the forage cart, hastily packed, does not shift to any appreciable extent.

One of the squadron leaders considers that the picket line is the horses. I do not agree with this, as if horses have had a quietly enough fastened to a peg, by the head rope, until the cart is carried on the sword for this purpose, the head rope being attached to the cart, have not had a hard day's work there will not be much delay in getting the cart on.

I strongly recommend that a specially constructed light forage cart be sent to Aldershot for trial as soon as possible.

VII. MISCELLANEOUS.

1. WEATHER.

The week ending 12th September can be described as a week being very hot. There was, however, a pleasant breeze on the 13th September the weather, though still warm, became cooler. On the 13th, rain falling during the night. On both the 14th and 15th, rain falling during the night. On the 16th and 17th September were fine, cloudy, and cool, but on the 18th September heavy rain fell from early morning till evening, and continued without intermission so that in the evening the ground was very wet. On the 19th September the weather was fine, and the Manœuvres were abandoned. As no improvement in the state of the weather was to be expected, this decision was fortunate.

2. BANDS IN THE VILLAGES.

The playing of the bands in the villages became very popular. It has been more appreciated if I had given longer notice, and the delay in the harvesting many of the villagers were in the fields at 5 o'clock. If, however, the hour had been earlier, they would not have got back to their camps until after nightfall.

4. SHIRTS.

many of the men of battalions who join the command wear linen or cotton shirts, but will never be checked until in the Army, as in the case of officers are to see frequently the underclothing of their men on parade.

5. SOCKS.

A new pattern sock, the seam of which is brought to the side of the heels. It is much liked and will probably help to reduce the friction compared with the previous pattern these socks protect the feet better, and do not slip down around the ankle. It has been suggested that they last longer in water before being worn.

6. HELMETS.

Obtaining a slightly head covering which shall give sufficient protection to the soldier to fire when in marching order in the prone position, has not yet been accomplished. It might be better to let the soldier wear a helmet, giving him a sun helmet when he goes abroad. It is obvious that the Colonies and India which exist cannot be necessary. The soldier never walks out in a helmet for pleasure, and in large numbers can ever be as comfortable as a cap. I am of opinion that the Morion shaped one brought forward last year by the Staff, which enables the Infantry soldier to shoot or a gunner to lay down by the Infantry (Guards) is not serviceable; the Officer Commanding that wore it reports that his men's caps are completely ruined, and only one cap fit for wear on parade, although the Manœuvres lasted for a month.

7. WATER-BOTTLES.

Bottles should be filled and inspected every morning before the troops start. This should receive attention in future.

8. SHOEING.

Use of very soft material, wore quickly, and were very thin, and many as a rule shod before going to the Manœuvres, and one pair of shoes was not sufficient for even a fortnight. One squadron lost 29 shoes, the Field Artillery lost 24, which indicates that something also was the matter. The Artillery had, however, only 50 sets of machine made shoes. At Aldershot it was found that many horses of one of the Divisional squadrons had bruised feet. This squadron had only been employed for 13 days, and it is better than we have done that the machine made shoes shall be used to reconsider my recommendation made last year that 50 per cent. of the shoes should be machine made.

MARKS ON EXPERIMENTAL EQUIPMENT.

(PATTERN).—These are of two kinds, one iron enamelled the other tin. The tin in a short time gets rusty and useless, and in addition the tin is not suitable for troops. The tin pattern soils the men's clothing and the iron chips. (BOYES' PATTERN AND NEW PATTERN IRON ENAMELLED).—The iron being covered with felt. As the reports on their shape, were equal, I have had the bottles passed to the Ordnance and report, which is to be rendered on the 1st January, 1892. (STEEL).—These form a useful addition to the water cart, and are quickly filled and preventing waste of water. A drinking cup to be attached by a chain to each cart. This is to prevent waste of water incurred by the men holding their mouths down to the cart.

(HOGAN'S COMBINED).—These were tried for carriage. The combined carriage and bayonet is not satisfactory, but when carried singly they are useful. Some slight alterations are now being made to the hips, and a further trial will be carried out.

(HOGAN'S COMBINED).—I recommend the adoption of this tool for the head gives greater force when the tool is used as a pick and allows of a more powerful stroke with the axe.

(ATTACHMENTS).—These were used by the Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers, but are approved of by the Royal Artillery only. I cannot say there is nothing so serviceable as a strap and buckle, for all

FROG SWORD SADDLE (MARK II).—The Mark II. is an improvement, but the ring strap should be slightly wider, while the stud should be lower and should be riveted right through.

HOOF PICKERS.—I recommend their being carried on the shoe case behind the sword. They are so seldom used except to remove tan when the horse comes out of the Riding School that it seems scarcely worth while to put them on the men's bodies.

TRACE HOOKS (EXPERIMENTAL).—These are certainly an improvement on the existing pattern. Spare rubber rings should be taken on service to replace those which may be damaged.

HORSE COLLARS (STEEL).—There can be no question that these form the most satisfactory collar for Army Service Corps work. They make so much noise however by the rattling of the links and, what for want of a better name I must call hame hooks, that I do not recommend them in their present form for fighting units.

SWIVELS PILING (MAGAZINE RIFLE).—The piling swivels are now quite satisfactory.

LIGHTENING LOAD OF CAVALRY HORSE.—With the view of lightening the load at present put on the Cavalry horse, as laid down in the Manual for Field Service, Cavalry, 1888, Appendix IV., pages 56-57, I obtained sanction for the following articles, packed in the corn sacks, being carried in forage carts, of which two were allotted to each squadron.

	lbs.	ozs.		lbs.	ozs.
Corn sack ...	1	13	Drawers ...	1	0½
Picketing gear ...	3	4	Socks ...	0	5
Ankle boots ...	3	13	Towel ...	0	8½
Horse brush ...	0	11	Holdall ...	0	10
Clothes brush ...	0	4	Housewife ...	0	3¼
Stable sponge ...	0	1	Pad for surcingle and surcingle ...	0	12¼
Oil bottle ...	0	4	Spare pants ...	2	8
Pot of grease ...	1	1¾	Putties ...	0	8
Pocket ledger ...	0	2	Cape ...	2	0
Spare boot laces ...	0	2	Forage net ...	2	2½
Service cap ...	0	¼	Waterproof sheet ...	2	5
Flannel shirt ...	1	1			
				24	13

The experiment answered well. The officers who carried it out reporting favourably on it.

It was, however, brought to notice that the forage cart is not properly balanced for this sort of work. It is too short in the body, causing the load to ride high with the result that readjustment frequently becomes necessary on the march.

I think a light four-wheeled wagon is better adapted for this purpose than a two-wheeled vehicle, in spite of the danger that once we get to four wheels four horses will be demanded and there is risk of overloading.

The four-wheeled wagon is more easily packed and does not require the nicety of adjustment which is essential with the forage cart, and which I do not think would be attended to in the hurry of packing up on service. Moreover, the load of the four-wheeled wagon, even when hastily packed, does not shift to any appreciable extent.

One of the squadron leaders considers that the picketing gear should be carried on the horses. I do not agree with this, as if horses have had a hard day's work they will stand quietly enough fastened to a peg, by the head rope, until the carts come up, and one peg could be carried on the sword for this purpose, the head rope being already on the horse. If the horses have not had a hard day's work there will not be much delay before the arrival of the carts.

I strongly recommend that a specially constructed light four-wheeled wagon, with a cover, be sent to Aldershot for trial as soon as possible.

VII. MISCELLANEOUS.

1. WEATHER.

The week ending 12th September can be described as bright and warm, the last four days being very hot. There was, however, a pleasant breeze on the top of the Downs. On the 13th September the weather, though still warm, became cloudy and the glass went back 3-10ths., rain falling during the night. On both the 14th and 15th September it was fine in the early morning but steady rain commenced about 9 a.m., and continued during the whole day. The 16th and 17th September were fine, cloudy, and cool, but the glass continued to fall steadily. On the 18th September heavy rain fell from early morning until the evening, and the hills remained covered with mist the whole day. On the 19th very heavy rain fell from early morning and continued without intermission so that in the forenoon the orders were issued to abandon the Manœuvres, and as no improvement in the state of the weather occurred for many days after the return to quarters this decision was fortunate.

2. BANDS IN THE VILLAGES.

The playing of the bands in the villages became very popular, although it would have been more appreciated if I had given longer notice, and the hours had been somewhat later, for owing to the delay in the harvesting many of the villagers were still on the fine days working in the fields at 5 o'clock. If, however, the hour had been made later than 4 p.m. the bands would not have got back to their camps until after nightfall.

3. POLICE.

The conduct of the troops was so good that very little assistance was required from the police in maintaining order.

The Military Mounted Police in each camp might have been reduced by two, and they should have arrived there before any of the troops.

The Chief Constable of the County furnished four mounted constables, two were located near each Divisional Camp; but they were mounted on horses untrained to military sights and sounds and the undivided attention of their riders was not given to their duties.

4. TIME GUN.

This proved to be of great use in ensuring punctuality.

In future it should be fired at 8 or 8-30 p.m., and the last post should not be later than 9-30 p.m.

5. CANTEENS.

In future, when Militia or Volunteers join camp with the Line, the arrangements for canteens and tentage should approximate nearly to those of the rest of the force.

VIII. HEALTH.

1. HEALTH OF MEN AND MEDICAL ARRANGEMENTS.

From our experience this year it is evident the number of medical officers I had detailed, two for each Division, was not sufficient, as although the health of the men was good, yet with young soldiers, the numbers who reported sick were greater than two medical officers could inspect before the daily work of the Division commenced. The greatest number which reported sick in either Division in one day was 240. During the 16 days absence from Aldershot, 2400 reported themselves sick, but of these 41 per cent. only were placed under treatment; of these 29 per cent. were treated in camp, whilst 12 per cent. were sent to Aldershot. Of the cases sent to Aldershot 114 were for venereal, 26 for blistered feet, and the remainder from other causes, principally rheumatism. (See Appendix K).

The selection of tobacco which is to be sold in Regimental Canteens requires special attention. At present it is generally too strong for consumption by the soldier whose marching and accuracy in shooting is materially effected by its use. On service the soldier could not use these tobaccos without risk of originating or aggravating heart disease.

The Medical Officer in Charge of one Division states in his report on the 2nd day's march to the manoeuvres that "all the cases of vertigo, with pains in the chest, palpitation of the heart and shortness of breath, so common amongst young soldiers, are I believe entirely due to a combination of tobacco and prolonged exertion."

There is fashion in this taste as in every other, and it is most desirable to gradually establish the fashion of smoking tobaccos of milder brands than those at present sold in canteens. I recommend this question be taken up at once.

I now regret that I did not utilize the Manoeuvres for the testing of a field hospital. In Section V., sub-section 4, I allude to the necessity of teaching soldiers how to roll and place in its valise the bell tent. It is thought there may be considerable difficulty in repacking a field hospital into the regulated space by any except those who have had considerable practice in doing so. I recommend I be permitted to send out a field hospital when employing field columns next year.

2. HEALTH OF HORSES.

The general condition of the horses remained good in spite of the very inclement weather. Epizootic fever had prevailed in one Cavalry regiment before the squadron detached from it left Aldershot, but partly owing to the care which the squadron leader took of his horses, they returned, if anything, in rather better condition than they were in when they started.

IX. COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGES.

Many owners who were willing to give permission for the troops to manoeuvre over their land objected to encampments being formed on it, and therefore two forms of agreement were drawn out (see Appendices L and M), to take the place of the one form used in 1890. Except as at Churn last year, where the owner, Lord Wantage, gave the whole of his encamping ground without making any charge, it will be generally necessary to have these two forms and to hire the land actually used for encampments, because as pasture is favourable for the troops to encamp on, so is the damage of it likely to be serious in continuous wet weather.

The prices paid on this occasion for grass land averaged £1 and for arable land 15s. per acre, and it was stipulated that no claims should be made except for damage to hedges and gates, and that the troops were on vacating the ground to fill in all excavations to the satisfaction of the owner. Too much trouble cannot be taken by officers to ensure that the troops fill in tent trenches, rubbish pits, latrines, &c. The amount claimed at Soberton was heavier than it would have been in consequence of neglect in this matter.

As the system of Manoeuvres without an Act of Parliament progresses, ground for encampments will probably be procured at much lower rates, as there is no doubt arable fields benefit greatly by being used as camping grounds for men and horses. I suggest I be permitted to send an officer into the Meon-Soberton district in 1892, to report on the state of the crops on fields where troops were encamped. Appendix N shows clearly the compensation paid for

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SUTLERS' WAGONS.—Most of the demands this year has been for the great cause of difference between wagon carries two tons with a 3-in. tyre.

I am considering the subject, but paid for by the troops.

The sum placed at my disposal for Later I was directed, if possible, to pay when the original amount was granted.

These drills cost £414, leaving £519 less than the amount available.

The expenditure is under my estimate having been curtailed.

It is right that I should place on assistance I received before and during Quarter Staff. Your presence on the ground visiting the camps on Friday evening, the weather continue very inclement and communicated with you early next morning steps were taken which resulted in the with the exception of one Field Battalion Division reaching Woolmer, except one another which marched to Portsmouth

XI. RESULTS.

On the 23rd September I received concerned during the Manoeuvres. I think

"Soldiers of all ranks have shown manner in which the great discomfort caused by them impressed the Lieutenant-General

"He has received from many manoeuvre ground and from the civil police the troops."

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damages, rent of ground, use of water, and grants in aid of roads. The total is what would be paid under ordinary conditions of weather. In continuous rain must be shifted frequently and consequently a larger area of ground is required.

I made the mistake of not sending the Military Police forward before parties arrived on the ground. These parties are always under less control than and their conduct gave rise to the only claim made for wilful damage.

Greater attention might have been paid by officers to the prevailing conditions marching home after the "Cease Fire" had been sounded.

In future it might be well to tell off two officers to take charge of the marching home after the "Cease Fire" had been sounded.

would add not only to the comfort of the latter but would prevent their getting the troops and doing damage to crops.

The occupiers named an assessor, but it was not found necessary to call in as the claims on the whole were fair and just, and the patriotic spirit of the occupiers enabled the officers representing the War Office to settle them without difficulty. At the termination of the Manœuvres, all claims having

About 10 days after the termination of the Manœuvres, all claims of the assessors went down to the ground and having come to an understanding with the owners, they paid the money due to them on the spot, taking a receipt. All claims except those of roads were disposed of in two days. This was greatly appreciated by those who had to deal with the disagreeable and disagreeable correspondence.

SUTLERS' WAGONS.—Most of the damage done to the roads for which has been demanded this year has been done by Sutlers' wagons, mainly those in the great cause of difference between the service and the Sutlers' transport but a wagon carries two tons with a 3-in. tyre while the others carry four tons on 4-in. tyres.

I am considering the subject, but any tax imposed on the wagons would be paid for by the troops.

X. EXPENSES.

The sum placed at my disposal for Drills and Manœuvres this year and Later I was directed, if possible, to provide for Cavalry Drills, which were when the original amount was granted.

These drills cost £414, leaving £4765. The actual cost of the Mancro £519 less than the amount available. (For details see Appendix O).

The expenditure is under my estimate, which is accounted for by the post having been curtailed.

It is right that I should place on record how much my duties were assisted by the assistance I received before and during the Manœuvres from you and other members of the Quarter Staff. Your presence on the ground enabled me to effect a considerable amount of work in visiting the camps on Friday evening, the 18th September, I came to the conclusion that if the weather continue very inclement next day, it would be well to disperse the troops as early as possible. I communicated with you early next morning, and having obtained your commands, the necessary steps were taken which resulted in the whole of the mounted troops marching on the 19th, with the exception of one Field Battery which marched to Hilsea, and the Cavalry Division reaching Woolmer, except one battalion of it which proceeded by rail to Portsmouth, and another which marched to Portsmouth that night.

XI. RESULTS OF EXPENDITURE.

On the 23rd September I recorded my great satisfaction with the manoeuvres. I then wrote:—

"Soldiers of all ranks have shown unflagging interest in the manner in which the great discomfort of the last few days, caused by bad weather, has been met by them impressed the Lieutenant-General Commanding most favourably."

"He has received from many of the residents living in the manœuvre ground and from the civil police uniformly satisfactory accounts of the troops."

From what I have learned from several different sources of information that the conduct and general bearing of the troops created a most favourable impression in the district in which they were working; this is the more remarkable as I believe that the massing of so many young men around quiet villages was apprehension by many in the neighbourhood, but was fortunately removed by the men. This happy result was doubtless brought about to a great extent by the officers, not only in maintaining discipline but also in the comfort of the men that they had no reason for desiring to leave camp. The officers of all ranks have improved to a very

In tactical skill, officers of all ranks have improved to a very great extent. There has been a marked improvement in military spirit, in eagerness to learn and to submit cheerfully to the necessary hardships and discomforts, is even more remarkable, and this spirit reacts naturally on the men. There has been this great improvement amongst Regimental

While there has been this great improvement amongst the efficiency of Staff and Supply Departments was manifested to at least an extent, the same was not the case with the Manceuvres of former years most of the Supplies were, I believe, obtained on this occasion, as also in 1890, everything was obtained through the Army.

The sudden abandonment of the Manœuvres, necessitating the conveyance of rations, which had been already prepared at Soberton and East Meon, to Woolmer, was carried out without any difficulty or friction. This was in no way due to my exertions, but to the knowledge, energy, and skill of the Staff and Supply Officers serving with me, to all of whom I am greatly indebted.

I am reporting separately on the attainments of all the Staff and Commanding Officers, but I must here record that in the whole of the arrangements before and during the Manœuvres, the Aldershot Divisional Staff, by taking all details off my hands, enabled me to devote my time to the initiation and consideration of tactical schemes, and thus to endeavour to obtain for the country the best value for its expenditure.



AUTUMN MANŒUVRE

Narrative of and Remarks on an Exercise
1st Division on the 10th Se

GENERAL IDEA

The commander of a Southern (Invading) force, came between Southwick and Fareham, pushes a reconnaissance cutting the railway at that place. On the afternoon of the neighbourhood of Soberton.

SPECIAL IDEA.—SOUTHERN

1 Troop of Cavalry.
1 Battery of Artillery.
1 Brigade of Infantry.

From Officer Commanding Southern force, Fareham,
To Officer Commanding at Soberton.

"You inform me of your arrival at Soberton without a
a.m. via Wallingswood farm, Peake farm, and West Meon,
enemy attack and endeavour to drive him North; if he is too
his advance South of the line Exton—Sheardley farm.

* Troops in support will reach Soberton at 10 a.m. to-mo

SPECIAL IDEA.—NORTHERN

2 troops of Cavalry.
2 batteries of Artillery
1 brigade of Infantry.

From Officer Commanding, Alton,
To Officer Commanding Flying Column, West Meon.

"I learn the enemy near Fareham is making a move N
towards Seaborton at 7-45 a.m., and if the enemy is encountered
Southward."

BOUNDARIES.

Boundary of manoeuvre ground, neutral zone and a line
manoeuvre map) to South-East corner of Greenfield copse.

In pursuance of the Special Idea the Northern force was
sent by 7-30 a.m. No one to be South of the line Whitew
7-45 a.m.

The Southern force was ordered to move at 7 a.m. N. West corner of Long cause near Teglease down—Meonstoke l

The Northern force was in position as ordered, but the command sent to reconnoitre that there was no means of exit for Old Winchester hill, sent the whole of his Infantry by road to the most practicable route for Infantry existed between Gatcombe and the artillery position was also to be found in a field on the lower hill, 500 yards to the South of Gatcombe farm, with an advantage of. The Northern Cavalry were ordered to see Moonstoke to Moonstoke down, 460 on manoeuvre map, South

The Southern force moved off under the following orders: Northward; two battalions were directed on Tegleaze down a road, and the rest on the coast road at 448. The Artillery eventually came into action.

At 8 a.m. scouts of the Northern force ascended the West
Southern slope in full view of the enemy.

At 8-7 a.m. the right of the Southern force was moving
 stake down near 460, where it came in contact with Cavalry
 then back.

At 8:25 a.m. a Cavalry patrol of the Southern force ascended the hill; no notice appeared to be taken of them by the Northern force. At the same time the head of the Northern Infantry passed Harve Hill. The Infantry was recalled a few minutes later and moved to the slopes of 460. At this moment the right of the Southern force, which was on the wooded crest of Winchester hill, swung round to the left.

At 8-41 a.m. the Southern Artillery came into action against the wooded crest of White Horse Hill, firing the slope South of Stock's farm, at ranges from 2200 to about 2400.

At 9 a.m. the right battalion of the Southern force, continued its advance along the Southern slopes of the left battalion of the Northern force which had moved a.m. the Northern Artillery for the first time came into action upon the Southern Artillery on Teglease down, at a time Artillery was of small aid to the force to which it belonged.

At 9:25 a.m., finding the battalion South of Stock's farm the enemy being in its front and on its right flank and no support having ordered it to fall back, and at 9:35 a.m. he ordered

During the greater part of the operations the flanks were more than a mile and a half distant from each other.

ment of the Manœuvres, necessitating the conveyance of rations, which at Soberton and East Meon, to Woolmer, was carried out without any was in no way due to my exertions, but to the knowledge, energy, supply Officers serving with me, to all of whom I am greatly indebted. tely on the attainments of all the Staff and Commanding Officers, in the whole of the arrangements before and during the Manœuvres, ff, by taking all details off my hands, enabled me to devote my time to ation of tactical schemes, and thus to endeavour to obtain for the expenditure.



AUTUMN MANŒUVRES, 1891.

Narrative of and Remarks on an Exercise of the Brigades of the 1st Division on the 10th September.

GENERAL IDEA.

The commander of a Southern (Invading) force, cantoned on the Wallington River between Southwick and Fareham, pushes a reconnaissance towards Ropley with the object of cutting the railway at that place. On the afternoon of the 9th September it has reached the neighbourhood of Soberton.

SPECIAL IDEA.—SOUTHERN FORCE.

- 1 Troop of Cavalry.
- 1 Battery of Artillery.
- 1 Brigade of Infantry.

From Officer Commanding Southern force, Fareham,
To Officer Commanding at Soberton.

"FAREHAM, 6 p.m. 9th September, 1891.
"You inform me of your arrival at Soberton without opposition. Move to-morrow at 7 a.m. via Wallopswood farm, Peake farm, and West Meon, upon Ropley; if you encounter the enemy attack and endeavour to drive him North; if he is too strong for you endeavour to prevent his advance South of the line Exton—Sheardley farm.

"Troops in support will reach Soberton at 10 a.m. to-morrow."

SPECIAL IDEA.—NORTHERN FORCE.

- 2 troops of Cavalry.
- 2 batteries of Artillery.
- 1 brigade of Infantry.

From Officer Commanding, Alton,
To Officer Commanding Flying Column, West Meon,

"ALTON, 6 p.m. 9th September, 1891.
"I learn the enemy near Fareham is making a move Northward. Reconnoitre to-morrow towards Soberton at 7.45 a.m., and if the enemy is encountered attack and drive him to the Southward."

BOUNDARIES.

Boundary of manœuvre ground, neutral zone and a line drawn from Teglease down (599 on manœuvre map) to South-East corner of Greenfield copse.

In pursuance of the Special Idea the Northern force was ordered to assemble at Gatcombe farm by 7.30 a.m. No one to be South of the line Whitewool—Gatcombe farm—Exton before 7.45 a.m.

The Southern force was ordered to move at 7 a.m. No one to be North of the line North-West corner of Long copse near Teglease down—Meonstoke before 7.45 a.m.

The Northern force was in position as ordered, but the commander hearing from the officer he had sent to reconnoitre that there was no means of exit for Infantry towards the lower slopes of Old Winchester hill, sent the whole of his Infantry by road towards Meonstoke and Soberton. (A practicable route for Infantry existed between Gatcombe farm and Peake farm). An excellent Artillery position was also to be found in a field on the lower Western slopes of Old Winchester hill, 500 yards to the South of Gatcombe farm, with an easy approach, which was not taken advantage of. The Northern Cavalry were ordered to scout towards Winchester hill and via Meonstoke to Meonstoke down, 460 on manœuvre map, South of Stock's farm.

The Southern force moved off under the following orders:—The Cavalry to scout to the Northward; two battalions were directed on Teglease down and two battalions by the race-course to cross-roads at 448. The Artillery eventually came into action on Teglease down.

At 8 a.m. scouts of the Northern force ascended the Western ridges of Winchester hill on its Southern slope in full view of the enemy.

At 8.7 a.m. the right of the Southern force was moving on Teglease down, the left on Meonstoke down near 460, where it came in contact with Cavalry scouts of the Northern force and drove them back.

At 8.25 a.m. a Cavalry patrol of the Southern force ascended the Southern slope of Winchester hill; no notice appeared to be taken of them by the Northern patrol on the top of the hill. At the same time the head of the Northern Infantry passed Harvestgate farm towards Winchester hill. This Infantry was recalled a few minutes later and moved by Stock's farm against the Northern slopes of 460. At this moment the right of the Southern Infantry, which had been directed against the wooded crest of Winchester hill, swung round to the Westward.

At 8.41 a.m. the Southern Artillery came into action against the Northern Infantry ascending the slope South of Stock's farm, at ranges from 2200 to 2400 yards, the accurate range being about 2300.

At 9 a.m. the right battalion of the Southern force, subsequently supported by half a battalion, continued its advance along the Southern slopes of Winchester hill and was confronted by the left battalion of the Northern force which had moved up from Harvestgate farm. At 9.4 a.m. the Northern Artillery for the first time came into action from the West end of Meonstoke down upon the Southern Artillery on Teglease down, at a range of 2850 yards. The action of this Artillery was of small aid to the force to which it belonged.

At 9.25 a.m. finding the battalion South of Stock's farm was not in a position to advance, the enemy being in its front and on its right flank and no sufficient support at hand, the Chief of the Staff ordered it to fall back, and at 9.35 a.m. he ordered the "Cease fire" to be sounded.

During the greater part of the operations the flanks of each of the opposing forces were more than a mile and a half distant from each other.

REMARKS.

It appeared to the Umpires that sufficient attention was not paid to the directions of the Special Ideas. More careful examination of ground would have shown the Northern commander that an excellent Artillery position existed close to his point of assembly, from which he could have covered the movements of his Infantry to the Southward. The same error was observable on the Southern side. Its commander wished to place his Artillery on Meonstoke down, but imperfect information caused him to divert it to Teglease down, which did not afford him so good a position for covering an advance on the line indicated in the Special Idea.

The formation on both sides was too extended for the force employed. With such extension it is impracticable to communicate rapidly with the various units, which are also liable to be attacked and beaten in detail.

Unnecessary crowding was in some instances observed in the ranks, and officers were seen mounted under effective fire.

No scouting was carried out by the Southern Cavalry to the North-West.

SOBERTON, September 10, 1891.

CHAS. M. CLARKE, MAJOR-GENERAL,
Commanding 1st Division.

PRINTED AT THE FIELD PRINTING OFFICE, HEAD-QUARTERS, WEST MEON.



AUTUMN MANOEUVRE

Remarks by the Chief Umpire on Division on the 10th

GENERAL IDEA.

An advanced-guard of a Northern force is on the march, the object of gaining possession of the Portsmouth road.
A Southern force that has been raiding at Petersfield.

SPECIAL IDEA.—SOUTHERN

One-third squadron of Cavalry
1 battery of Field Artillery
3 battalions of Infantry

From Officer Commanding, Chalton,
To Officer Commanding, Petersfield.

"Guard your right flank from a Northern force that is on the march, and if attacked, take up a position on War Down, East of Chalton."

N.B.—Do not leave the cross-roads 282, near New

SPECIAL IDEA.—NORTHERN

One-third squadron of Cavalry
1 battery of Field Artillery
5 battalions of Infantry

From Officer Commanding, Winchester,
To Officer Commanding, East Meon.

"Enemy is raiding at Petersfield. Endeavour to cut off the communication, and attack him."

N.B.—Do not leave camp till 9-30 a.m., and proceed

CAVALRY.

The commanders on either side did not circulate the orders to their subordinates working under the disadvantage of ignorance. The Southern Cavalry scouts were observed to retire at a distance, and the commander was satisfied as to the information he received. A valuable message to the Southern commander was intercepted, but the message reached him till near the "Cease fire," too late.

ARTILLERY

The positions were well taken up and the Cordons appeared to answer its object admirably in concealing the positions. The range-finding party of one battery rode up to the presence of Artillery, which, however, did not come from flag to flag by opposing Artillery as ordered.

INFANTRY.

When marching along narrow lanes the intervals between the ranks for "Route marching" was lost sight of, this causes unnecessary delay. The fire should be strictly adhered to on all occasions. The fire was short time it lasted, but it was observed that a battalion became oblivious to the fact of the "Halt" having been ordered, escaping the fire of two battalions on its right flank.

SIGNALLING

It was observed that a party of signallers hugged the ground, an erroneous idea that their duties can be best performed in this manner.

GENERAL REMARKS.

The Commander of the Southern force seems to have received any information as to the whereabouts of the Northern force, with two battalions round beyond the boundary, in order to prevent not only in a wide separation between his force and the enemy, reaching what might appear to him a better position than was to take up a position if attacked.

Had it not been for a mistake made on the Southern side, the force must have been overpowered by two battalions of the Northern force.

His object, however, was almost attained on reaching the Portsmouth road, by two battalions Infantry and a battery Royal Artillery coming up.

The "Cease fire" sounded before it could be decided whether the Northern force had gained possession of the Portsmouth road.

W. F.

EAST MEON, September 10, 1891.

PRINTED AT THE FIELD PRINTING OFFICE, WEST MEON.



AUTUMN MANŒUVRES, 1891.

Remarks by the Chief Umpire on the Operations of the 2nd Division on the 10th September.

REMARKS.

Umpires that sufficient attention was not paid to the directions of the Special examination of ground would have shown the Northern commander that an error existed close to his point of assembly, from which he could have covered his infantry to the Southward. The same error was observable on the Southern side in placing his Artillery on Meonstoke down, but imperfect information was indicated in the Special Idea. Both sides was too extended for the force employed. With such extension communication rapidly with the various units, which are also liable to be interrupted in some instances observed in the ranks, and officers were seen to be tried out by the Southern Cavalry to the North-West.

CHAS. M. CLARKE, MAJOR-GENERAL,
Commanding 1st Division.

PRINTED AT THE FIELD PRINTING OFFICE, HEAD-QUARTERS, WEST MEON.

GENERAL IDEA.

An advanced-guard of a Northern force is on the march from East Meon to Clanfield with the object of gaining possession of the Portsmouth road. A Southern force that has been raiding at Petersfield is recalled to Portsmouth.

SPECIAL IDEA.—SOUTHERN FORCE.

One-third squadron of Cavalry.
1 battery of Field Artillery.
3 battalions of Infantry.

From Officer Commanding, Chalton,
To Officer Commanding, Petersfield.

“CHALTON, 5 a.m. September 10, 1891.

“Guard your right flank from a Northern force that was seen last night near East Meon, and if attacked, take up a position on War Down, East of the high road, falling back if necessary on Chalton.”

N.B.—Do not leave the cross-roads 282, near New Barn, before 9-45 a.m.

SPECIAL IDEA.—NORTHERN FORCE.

One-third squadron of Cavalry.
1 battery of Field Artillery.
5 battalions of Infantry.

From Officer Commanding, Winchester,
To Officer Commanding, East Meon.

“WINCHESTER, 5 a.m. September 10, 1891.

“Enemy is raiding at Petersfield. Endeavour to cut him off from his line of retreat, which is probably Chalton, and attack him.”

N.B.—Do not leave camp till 9-30 a.m., and proceed via Stonylands farm and Tegdown hill.

CAVALRY.

The commanders on either side did not circulate the printed general and special ideas, so their subordinates were working under the disadvantage of ignorance as to the object of the day's proceedings. The Southern Cavalry scouts were observed to retire at a gallop contrary to orders. The Northern commander was satisfied as to the information he received from his Cavalry, but a scout with a valuable message to the Southern commander was intercepted early in the day, and no further message reached him till near the “Cease fire,” too late to be of any use.

ARTILLERY.

The positions were well taken up and the Cordite powder fired by the Northern Artillery appeared to answer its object admirably in concealing the position from the opposing body.

The range-finding party of one battery rode up to the crest of War down apparently showing the presence of Artillery, which, however, did not come into action at the spot. No ranges taken from flag to flag by opposing Artillery as ordered.

INFANTRY.

When marching along narrow lanes the intervals between battalions and companies prescribed for “Route marching” was lost sight of, this causes unnecessary discomfort to the men and the orders should be strictly adhered to on all occasions. The fire discipline was well preserved during the short time it lasted, but it was observed that a battalion in its anxiety to reach its ordered destination became oblivious to the fact of the “Halt” having been sounded, and continued retiring, thus escaping the fire of two battalions on its right flank.

SIGNALLING.

It was observed that a party of signallers hugged the crest of the hills, no doubt under the erroneous idea that their duties can be best performed where they can be seen by both sides.

GENERAL REMARKS.

The Commander of the Southern force seems to have anticipated an attack on his front before he received any information as to the whereabouts of the enemy; this caused him to send a battery with two battalions round beyond the boundary, in order to ascend War down from the East side, resulting not only in a wide separation between his two wings but a delay of half an hour in reaching what might appear to him a better position than War down, on which it is noted he only was to take up a position if attacked.

Had it not been for a mistake made on the sound “Halt,” the battalion on his right flank must have been overpowered by two battalions of the enemy as it was beyond the reach of support.

His object, however, was almost attained on reaching a point on Holt down where his two battalions Infantry and a battery Royal Artillery commanded the road by which the Northern force was approaching.

The “Cease fire” sounded before it could be decided by a renewed attack as to which force had gained possession of the Portsmouth road.

East Meon, September 10, 1891.

W. F. SEYMOUR, MAJOR-GENERAL,
Commanding 2nd Division.

PRINTED AT THE FIELD PRINTING OFFICE, HEAD-QUARTERS, WEST MEON.



AUTUMN MANŒUVRES, 1891.

Narrative of and Remarks on the Operations of the 11th September.

GENERAL IDEA.

Two opposing forces are moving from Petersfield and Droxford respectively.

SPECIAL IDEA.—EASTERN FORCE.

The General Officer Commanding the Eastern force receives at 5 a.m. on the 11th September the following orders:—

From General Officer Commanding Army Corps, Midhurst.
To General Officer Commanding Division, Petersfield.

"MIDHURST, 3 a.m., September 11, 1891.

"Reconnoitre the country Westward to the river Meon between Meon Stoke and Webbs-green, one mile South of Soberton. When you reach Tegdown hill let your rear Brigade cook and be ready to march at 10.30 a.m.* Send forward the leading Brigade from Hyden hill Cross-roads 639 at 8 a.m. A squadron with 2 battalions to advance as far as the point marked 599 on Teglease down, where the Infantry will remain in support of the Cavalry, which is to endeavour to reach the river; the remainder of the Brigade to remain halted at the point marked 679 North of Leydean bottom.

"Instruct the General Commanding the leading Brigade to reconnoitre and report, but in no case to become so seriously engaged as to require support. If he meets with any considerable body of the enemy he is to fall back on the rear half of the Brigade, and then fight a delaying action until he reaches Tegdown hill, near which position I wish you to make a determined stand. You will take the offensive at 10.30 a.m. if you find you are not greatly outnumbered."

At 7.45 a.m. the Eastern force is to be in the undermentioned positions:—

The mounted troops and the leading brigade is in column of route on Hyden hill, the head of the column being on the Clanfield-East Meon road, while the rear Brigade is East of it at mark 723.

N.B.—At the hours indicated no one is to be West of the points named.

*It will not be considered available by the Umpires until this hour.

SPECIAL IDEA.—WESTERN FORCE.

The Officer Commanding the Western force having received general instructions to reconnoitre to the Eastward, at 8.30 a.m. the following is the situation:—The left Brigade is at the South-East corner of the triangular wood $\frac{1}{4}$ of a mile North of Sheardley Farm; the head of the column of route of the right Brigade is just short of and to the West of Chidden. The mounted troops with either brigade are not to be to the Eastward of these points.

The following orders were received by the General Officer Commanding the Western force at 5 a.m. on the 11th September:—

From General Officer Commanding Army Corps, Fareham.
To General Officer Commanding Division, Droxford.

"FAREHAM, 3 a.m., September 11, 1891.

"From reports I have received I infer that the enemy you may encounter immediately in your front is inferior in strength. Advance vigorously and push back the enemy towards Petersfield.

"I expect you to clear Tegdown hill by 12.30 p.m., but if the enemy is too strong for you to succeed, fall back, making a stand on Chidden down."

At the hour appointed for the commencement of the operations the squadron of the Eastern force, which from the state of the horses had apparently moved faster than the pace of manœuvre, reached a point 400 yards North-West of the point indicated in the Special Idea and pushed scouts to the Northward as far as Wickses and to the South as far as Chidden, where they were stopped by the right brigade of the Western force. The squadron had come on independently of the two battalions with which it was ordered to move and work; and, so far as the Umpires could learn, in complete independence of the General Officer Commanding the Eastern force. This officer accompanied the leading portion of his brigade to the same spot $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles in front of the remainder of his command, and is, therefore, responsible for its having got into the wrong position, and further for a company becoming engaged about 600 yards further to the West, where it was surrounded and eventually put out of action.

The Umpires observed that this company worked over exactly the same ground as the squadron, and without any apparent attempt to ascertain what the scouts of the squadron, who were $\frac{1}{2}$ mile in advance, had learnt of the enemy's movements.

The squadron might by moving on the Northern flank of the companies Western force have enabled a portion of the company to effect its retreat when it was attacked in front and on its flanks.

The General Officer in command of the Eastern force justified the conduct of the squadron leader by orders which he had given, forbidding Divisional Cavalry to fight. The views of the Lieutenant-General on the employment of Divisional Cavalry are contained under the heading "Cavalry," in the Programme dated Aldershot, 5th September, and in future are to be followed.

About 9.30 a.m. the right brigade of the Western force moving in a North-Easterly direction across Chidden down, struck the flank of the advanced half brigade of the Eastern force, and on service would have cut it off. The further advance was stopped by the Senior Umpire on the spot, who to avert the collision, directed both sides to retire. If this decision had not been given half the brigade of the Eastern force would have paid the penalty of disregarding the instructions laid down in the Special Idea, which indicated that the delaying action was to be fought after the brigade had reunited.



AUTUMN MANŒUVRES, 1891.

Narrative of and Remarks on an Exercise of the Brigades of the
1st Division on the 12th September.

GENERAL IDEA.

After the fight on the 10th September, the Officer Commanding Northern force finding the enemy had been reinforced fell back across the Meon, at West Meon, leaving a force in observation on the line Old Winchester Hill-Gatcombe farm.

SPECIAL IDEA.—NORTHERN FORCE.

- 1 battery.
2 battalions.
Royal Engineers.

The following orders were left with the Officer Commanding Force of Observation:—
 "Place outposts and watch the country in your front without moving South of the line Old
 Winchester Hill-Gatcombe farm; if attacked retard the enemy's advance as much as possible;
 reinforcements are moving to our assistance from Alton. If compelled to retire, do so along the
 Western slopes of the Teglease Down-West Meon ridge between that ridge and Peake farm."

The Northern force will be in position by 8 a.m.

SPECIAL IDEA—SOUTHERN FORCE.

- 1 squadron Cavalry.
2 batteries Artillery.
2 brigades of 3 battalions.

The officer commanding at Soberton determines to reconnoitre the enemy's position about Old Winchester hill, but not wishing to become involved in a direct frontal attack issues the following instructions to the officer commanding the force detailed for the purpose:—

"Move via Greenfield copse, Stoke wood and Westend farm, towards Chidden Down, and under cover of the long copse West of Teglease farm make your dispositions for a reconnaissance of the Old Winchester hill position; if not too strongly held endeavour to carry it."

The Southern force will be ordered to be in position by 8 a.m. No one to be West of the copse (from Greenfield copse to Teglease down) before that hour.

SUMMARIES.—Manœuvre boundary, neutral zone.

The respective forces were in position at the hours assigned.

The General Officer Commanding Division obtained the permission of the Lieutenant-General commanding to so far modify the regulations concerning the neutral zone as to admit of the Northern force, if repulsed, retiring along the Teglease down—West Meon ridge instead of along the Western slopes thereof.

This permission was communicated to the Officer Commanding Northern force in writing before he started, and he was also informed verbally by the Major-General Commanding that he could move to the position he was ordered to take up by the Teglease down road.

This however, he did not do, but on reaching the cross roads North-West of Sheardley Farm, he proceeded by the Northern track, thinking it the more direct road.

This position was as follows:—Left battalion with a line of observation from the East of Winchester hill wood on the left to West of "camp" on the right, supports and reserve in rear behind the crest of the hill; right Battalion continuing the observation line down the Western slope of Winchester hill, supports and reserve in rear; Artillery to the South of the hedge near 394 on the 6 in. map; Royal Engineers entrenching a position between the 600 and 500 contour on the Southern slope North of East end of "camp."

At 9 a.m., subsequent to scouting by the Cavalry, the Southern force pushed forward an infantry attack against the Northern left; this attack being unsupported was not permitted to continue. The Commander of this force did not intend its being pushed as far as it was.

The Officer Commanding the Southern force, although the point of assembly and the Special Line indicated a general line of attack, and although the reports received by him from the Cavalry did not estimate the enemy's strength at more than two Battalions, decided that he could not attack the position from the South-East, and thereupon directed one Brigade via Chidden on Meonstoke, and the remainder of his Infantry (excepting that which was confronting his enemy's left) on Harvestgate Farm. His Artillery was sent to Meonstoke down near 460 on Manœuvre map.

This involved half his Infantry in a march of from 9 to 10 miles from his camp to the point of attack, instead of less than half that distance. The Infantry directed on Harvestgate Farm also covered a much greater distance than the scheme demanded.

When the Southern force attack on the left of the Northern position (alluded to above) was made, a report reached the Commander of the latter that his left was turned, whereupon he ordered his right battalion to quit the lower slopes of Winchester hill and retire along the bottom to the North-East.

Soon afterwards hearing that this verbal report that had reached him was incorrect, he ordered the battalion to resume its position. The first retirement left his Artillery unsupported, and both caused his Infantry unnecessary fatigue.

The Southern attack from the direction of Meonstoke, Exton and Harvestgate Farm, was developed about 10.45 a.m., and soon afterwards the Northern Commander ordered the retirement of his right battalion along the bottom to the North-East, which involved a climb of the precipitous slopes on the South-West of the Teglease down—West Meon ridge.

The Artillery of the Southern force was in action throughout on Meonstoke down, on which it took up various positions. The Artillery of the Northern force was principally passive and contributed but little to the events of the day.

[OVER.

batteries of the Eastern Artillery, well posted on Wetherdown, opened fire, which at this time was being well handled, advanced by alternate companies in the configuration of the ground. Both forces were considerably impeded in the vicinity of Hyden hill, and it was necessary for the Umpires to cause the troops to pass in column along the roadway, in order to avoid the damage caused had the troops used the ground as they would in war. The Umpires observed on Chidden down a company of the leading battalion to a flank, within 150 yards of a battalion which was then firing on it. The captain informing the Umpire-in-Chief that he had been ordered to lead his battalion to make this movement. Attention is called to the same of Manœuvres, 1891.

for the escort that an Umpire had ordered it to retire, but the officer
ed such an order, should have explained that he was escorting the guns.

...having altered the situation, delayed the power to advance the rear half-an-hour, permitting it, however, to prepare the position, which was making well done. The screens representing the shelter trenches were on the Western slope, but the copes which fringe Tegdown bottom before the Western force attacked. On the North-West slope some were superfluous, a hedge itself forming a better line of defence. The 1st battalion of the Western force was on the left.

The men were then under heavy Artillery fire, and while in this position the Eastern force which attempted a direct advance

was exposed, but that 2 companies of the leading battalion Eastern force
by the Artillery and Infantry fire to which they had been exposed
been terminated.

REMARKS.

of the operations the following was the situation :—The Artillery of the Western force was in close formation on the right on the ridgeway track concealed for the most part in scrub; the Northern force was in position on the slopes; the Eastern force had its Artillery on Tegdown Hill about 600 or 700 yards down the Northern slope from the ridgeway where the main battalions of the rear brigade were in the main position, and two battalions of the leading brigade made a counter attack as it appeared to the Umpires. It is worthy of consideration whether the Western force should not have had its three battalions more concentrated on the ridge than they were at present, and also whether a counter attack should have been attempted by the Eastern force ready to fight, the two reserve battalions occupying the position.

Western force was well and carefully arranged, so as to ensure not
tion of the forces. The most serious errors noticed in brigade work
took no notice of the squadron of the Eastern force retiring in close
along the Northern slopes of Teglease down. The Umpires present
the attention of the troops being preoccupied by their being required
and generally speaking to the advance being made too much of a drill
and half hour, when the leading battalion of the leading brigade
opened fire at an effective range in column of route on the track, and
in spite of the loss they would incur, continued the advance although
informed of the Umpires, on approaching such a prepared position, the
line should have informed the General Commanding the brigade,
and to the front or sent a Staff Officer to have reconnoitred the position
as to an advance on it.

took no notice. Cavalry engaged with fire action

unless such orders are obeyed it is impossible for the Umpires to
the last three.

The last three paras., under heading Infantry, of the programme and officer of the fractions placed out of action. The likely to arise when units are placed out of action.

be men will march with their rifles over the shoulder, butt to the

... of Autumn Manœuvres, 1891, was not obeyed.
... amongst the units.

were illegible from being written with bad pencils.
was taken of the balloon by the

used reports should be made of the force of the wind.

By order,
ber, 1891.

J. ALLEYNE, COLONEL,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

FIELD PRINTING OFFICE, HEAD-QUARTERS, WEST MEON.

REMARKS.

Northern force.—It appeared to the Umpires that a careful examination of the map during the march to the position, and of the position when he arrived at it, should have induced the Northern Commander to place his Artillery at the "camp," which is palpably the best spot from which to command the country the Idea required him to watch. From this point the retirement was easy, whereas it was next to impracticable in the position taken up. The reason he gave for not doing so, *i.e.*, that a field on the lower Western slopes of Winchester hill had been considered a good Artillery position for operations carried on under different conditions, cannot be accepted as sound.

His line of retreat, if repulsed, lay along a narrow ridge, and the entrenching of slopes below that ridge was unnecessary. Moreover the slope was so steep and so exposed to enfilade fire from the dominant ridge that it was extremely unlikely an attack would be delivered there. He did not appear to have made any personal examination of the ground with reference to the placing of the entrenchments.

The Umpires are compelled to criticise the first withdrawal of the Infantry from the right of the position upon receipt of a verbal message that the left was turned, it appeared to them that the Commander should have assured himself of the necessity of withdrawal before ordering the retirement of men, who had to be brought back again to the position when the true state of affairs on his left became known.

The final retirement of his right was also directed over the same difficult ground.

Southern force.—Considering the reports received from the scouts, the Umpires think the Commander should have directed his attack on Old Winchester hill from the South-East; the ground favours an Infantry advance in successive waves, and fire from the high ground near West End Cottage would have prevented the defenders from coming down the slopes of the Northern position near Winchester wood, and without their doing so they could not reach with their fire a great part of the ground over which the attack would come. The decision arrived at involved a long detour, giving time for an enemy's supports to come up and materially impairing the freshness of the Infantry, so necessary for an attack on a difficult position.

An excellent Artillery position to cover the attack was also available near West End down.

The wide separation of forces does not appear to the Umpires to be sound.

Signals on both sides were read by the opposing forces.

CHAS. M. CLARKE, MAJOR-GENERAL,
Commanding 1st Division.

SOBERTON, September 12, 1891.

PRINTED AT THE FIELD PRINTING OFFICE, HEAD-QUARTERS, WEST MEON.



AUTUMN MANŒUVRES,

Narrative of and Remarks on an Exercise bet in the 2nd Division on the 12th S

GENERAL IDEA.

The Northern force having fallen back on Fronsfield is reinforced on Portsmouth. The Southern force is still holding the Portsmouth

SPECIAL IDEA.—NORTHERN FOR

Two-thirds squadron of Cavalry.
1 battery (6 guns).
6 battalions of Infantry.

From Officer Commanding, Fronsfield,
To Officer Commanding, Twentyways farm.

"Fronsfield

"Enemy reported to be hurrying back on Portsmouth from
him without delay."

N.B.—No troops must be South of the road Twentyways farm

SPECIAL IDEA.—SOUTHERN FOR

One-third squadron of Cavalry.
2 batteries (10 guns).
2 battalions of Infantry.

From Officer Commanding, Idsworth,
To Officer Commanding, Chalton.

"Idsworth

"Enemy's camp fires have been observed in the neighbor
hood of outposts North of Chalton to cover my supply train retire

N.B.—You must be in position at 7-30 a.m., moving thereto
and 4th.

CAVALRY.

Owing to similar dress the Cavalry were of little or no
commanders, as they were ordered to camp.

ARTILLERY.

The withdrawal of the battery from War down was delayed
not of being out off, but masking on its retirement the fire of t
up its position on High down. The battery firing Cordite powder
of action two batteries opposite, after firing 45 minutes. The c
then detached the battery to his other flank, where it was put
but it may be observed that had this battery fired shell it
position, certainly have drawn the opposite Artillery command
point from which Artillery fire might be expected. An oppo
Infantry in column in a deep valley was lost by the Southern.

INFANTRY.

The Northern force exposed its Infantry before its adv
the from War down.

In coming over Osbourne down a thin line of skin
advanced up to two companies firing volleys, well sheltered,
This company was ordered back.

The Southern advanced line of pickets was out of touch
a reconnaissance was ordered, adopted the formation of a line
later, however, they retired in good order, and retarded th
giving time to the Artillery to retire from its forward position.

GENERAL REMARKS.

The distance between the two Northern columns prevent
smallest position taken up by the Southern commander, and
was ordered on the Chalton down position it was far too weak to
probably, under the orders the Southern commander had rec
commanded when he found his line of retreat in danger by th
his left flank.

W. F. SEY

East Meon, September 12, 1891.

PRINTED AT THE FIELD PRINTING OFFICE, HEAD-QUARTERS, WEST MEON.

REMARKS.

It appeared to the Umpires that a careful examination of the map during the exercise, and of the position when he arrived at it, should have induced the Commander to place his Artillery at the "camp," which is palpably the best spot from the country the Idea required him to watch. From this point the retirement was next to impracticable in the position taken up. The reason he gave for a field on the lower Western slopes of Winchester hill had been considered for operations carried on under different conditions, cannot be accepted as

if repulsed, lay along a narrow ridge, and the entrenching of slopes below was very. Moreover the slope was so steep and so exposed to enfilade fire from the front it was extremely unlikely an attack would be delivered there. He did not make any personal examination of the ground with reference to the placing of the

compelled to criticise the first withdrawal of the Infantry from the right of the line. A verbal message that the left was turned, it appeared to them that the Commander had assured himself of the necessity of withdrawal before ordering the retreat to be brought back again to the position when the true state of affairs was

of his right was also directed over the same difficult ground.

Considering the reports received from the scouts, the Umpires think the Commander directed his attack on Old Winchester hill from the South-East; the Infantry advance in successive waves, and fire from the high ground near West End prevented the defenders from coming down the slopes of the Northern hill, and without their doing so they could not reach with their fire over which the attack would come. The decision arrived at involved a sacrifice for an enemy's supports to come up and materially impairing the freshness of the Infantry for an attack on a difficult position.

A position to cover the attack was also available near West End down. The position of forces does not appear to the Umpires to be sound.

These remarks were read by the opposing forces.

CHAS. M. CLARKE, MAJOR-GENERAL,
Commanding 1st Division.
September 12, 1891.

PRINTED AT THE FIELD PRINTING OFFICE, HEAD-QUARTERS, WEST MEON.



AUTUMN MANŒUVRES, 1891.

Narrative of and Remarks on an Exercise between opposing forces in the 2nd Division on the 12th September.

GENERAL IDEA.

The Northern force having fallen back on Froxfield is reinforced and ordered to advance again on Portsmouth. The Southern force is still holding the Portsmouth—London road.

SPECIAL IDEA.—NORTHERN FORCE.

Two-thirds squadron of Cavalry.
1 battery (6 guns).
6 battalions of Infantry.

From Officer Commanding, Froxfield,
To Officer Commanding, Twentyways farm.

"FROXFIELD, 6 a.m. September 12, 1891.

"Enemy reported to be hurrying back on Portsmouth from Chalton. Harass and attack him without delay."

N.B.—No troops must be South of the road Twentyways farm-New Barn till 7-15 a.m.

SPECIAL IDEA.—SOUTHERN FORCE.

One-third squadron of Cavalry.
2 batteries (10 guns).
2 battalions of Infantry.

From Officer Commanding, Idsworth,
To Officer Commanding, Chalton.

"IDSWORTH, 10 p.m. September 11, 1891.

"Enemy's camp fires have been observed in the neighbourhood of Froxfield. Take up a line of outposts North of Chalton to cover my supply train retreating on Portsmouth."

N.B.—You must be in position at 7-30 a.m., moving thereto by Stonylands farm, level 739 and 494.

CAVALRY.

Owing to similar dress the Cavalry were of little or no use and only confused other commanders, so they were ordered to camp.

ARTILLERY.

The withdrawal of the battery from War down was delayed too long, not only running the risk of being cut off, but masking on its retirement the fire of the battery that had already taken up its position on Holt down. The battery firing Cordite powder was judged to have placed out of action two batteries opposite, after firing 45 minutes. The commander of the Northern force then detached the battery to his other flank, where it was put out of action by the Infantry fire; but it may be observed that had this battery fired shell it would, at 1300 yards in an open position, certainly have drawn the opposite Artillery commander's attention more vividly to the point from which Artillery fire might be expected. An opportunity of shelling a brigade of Infantry in column in a deep valley was lost by the Southern Artillery.

INFANTRY.

The Northern force exposed its Infantry before its advance in close columns to Artillery fire from War down.

In coming over Oxenbourne down a thin line of skirmishers of about half a company advanced up to two companies firing volleys, well sheltered, without waiting for its supports. This company was ordered back.

The Southern advanced line of pickets was out of touch with the main body, and when a reconnaissance was ordered, adopted the formation of a line of skirmishers advancing to attack. Later, however, they retired in good order, and retarded the advance of the Northern force, giving time to the Artillery to retire from its forward position on War down.

GENERAL REMARKS.

The distance between the two Northern columns prevented any simultaneous attack on the excellent position taken up by the Southern commander, and when the attack of the left column was ordered on the Chalton down position it was far too weak to have effected its purpose. Though, probably, under the orders the Southern commander had received, the position would have been evacuated when he found his line of retreat in danger by the Northern column working round his left flank.

EAST MEON, September 12, 1891.

W. F. SEYMOUR, MAJOR-GENERAL,
Commanding 2nd Division.

PRINTED AT THE FIELD PRINTING OFFICE, HEAD-QUARTERS, WEST MEON.

Narrative of and Remarks on an 1st Division on the

GENERAL

The rear-guard of a Northern (Defending) force, has halted about Chidden on the line Sheardley farm—Chidden—South-West. The force has halted for the night at Hambledon.

SPECIAL IDEA.—SOUTHERN

1 squadron.
2 batteries.
2 brigades.

From Officer Commanding main body, South.
To Officer Commanding advance-guard, Hambledon.

"Move at 8 a.m. to-morrow and attack the enemy."

BOUNDARY

North, neutral zone; East, line 393, manure
Greenfield copse—Teglease down.

SPECIAL IDEA.—NORTHERN

1 battery.
3 battalions.
Royal Engineer.

From Officer Commanding main body, East Meon.
To Officer Commanding rear guard, near Chidden.

"To enable me to establish myself on the high ground, I will advance as much as possible; fight every inch."

BOUNDARY

North, neutral zone; East, line Leydean Bottom
Teglease down—Greenfield copse.

The following was the position of the outposts on the morning of the 15th September. One battalion occupied the line from Sheardley farm to Chidden. The other two battalions, on Chidden down. Cycles were sent to the South.

The village of Chidden was placed in a state of defence in order to command the approaches to the village. The first sign of the Southern force was a Cavalry detachment of the Manoeuvre ground, about 8-30 a.m. from Hambledon about 8-5 a.m. to reconnoitre the fire line. The Infantry, which eventually moved on Chidden and Hermitage Farm, the other to make contact.

The Southern Infantry advanced through Chidden (Coombe Wood on 6 in. map).

At 10-20 a.m. the right brigade of the Southern force moved on the ridge West of Leydean Bottom where it was p. of the Northern force. The "Cease fire" was

REMARKS

The Chief Umpire thinks that the scheme would have been successful. The Eastern boundary of the Northern force.—An outpost line is composed of a line of outposts. The time available was not long enough to place the outposts regularly.

No definite instructions appeared to have been given to the outposts to fall back and concentrate.

Infantry reconnoitring patrols were observed on the line to the West, but keeping so indifferent a look out that they did not see the far side of a small wood, whence they came.

The advanced company of the left half battalion, which was placed in a position from which it could see the position of the Northern force, became a very strong movement on the East was being made by the Northern force. The delay involved by a mistake would have been justified, notwithstanding his position.

No information of value appears to have been afforded to the Umpires that the Artillery could be used. A position existed a little to the West of Pa. and whence the advance of the Infantry could be seen. The Artillery did not come into action until the movement of the Infantry.

In regard to this turning movement, the Umpires considered it was not possible to attack a position by a frontal attack. The Umpires of the General and Special Ideas, have been justly criticised. The delay involved by a mistake would have been justified, notwithstanding his position.

CHAS. M.

Commanding

Summary, September 15, 1891.

PRINTED AT THE FIELD PRINTING OFFICE, WEST MEON.

At 9-35 a.m. two batteries of Horse Artillery came into action in a good position East of the lane, but their target was now indistinct as a thick fog was falling. This was followed by rain at 9-40 a.m., which continued until the operations were terminated. At this time, about three-quarters of an hour after the leading battalion Northern force had come into action, it had expended the ammunition allotted to it for the day.

About 9-40 a.m., when the Northern force endeavoured to advance, the Western force remained on the narrow neck contending for it, although a much better position was available a short distance further South with a broader frontage for firing on the enemy as he crossed the narrow neck.

At 9-55 a.m. the General Officer Commanding the Northern force detached the 2nd Brigade, which, owing to the lane being blocked, had covered one-and-a-half miles only since 9 a.m., to move by Whitewool and Coombe house to Chidden down. The Mounted Infantry had preceded this brigade, but moved a mile further to the Eastward, passing over Wether down.

The General Officer Commanding Western force intended in the first instance to have allowed his leading battalion to fall back gradually on to the Winchester hill—ridgeway track position. This was the movement which the Umpire-in-Chief who framed the scheme had contemplated as being the probable result of the Special Idea. In the printed orders, however, he inadvertently wrote "to Hyden hill" instead of "towards Hyden hill." This error would have been unfortunate for the Western force if the Northern force had advanced on the ridgeway and its Eastern slopes. The General in Command of the Western force feeling bound to take up an intermediate position, so as to reach Hyden hill if necessary, moved his troops as follows:—One battalion to the junction of the two lanes, one on Old Winchester hill supported by a third battalion placed between it and the fourth battalion which was on Teglease down. One battery was brought up to Winchester hill, and two remained on Teglease down. It appeared to the Umpires that the handling of the batteries at the last named place was characterised by uncertainty, as they were moved without opening fire from one position to another; but movements were rendered extremely difficult from the heavy fog obscuring all objects over 400 or 500 yards distant. This was the state of the weather when the 2nd Brigade of the Northern force having got on Chidden down came into collision with the rear brigade of the Western force.

At 11-20 the Umpire-in-Chief, in order to avoid accidents in the fog, terminated the operations.

REMARKS.

The General Officer Commanding Northern force suggested at the conference that his orders forced him to move all his troops by the lane leading from West Meon to Winchester hill. No such restriction was intended provided the troops were not moved South of the West Meon-Warnford road until the assigned hours—vide foot note to the Special Idea. If, however, such an argument is correct as regards the exit from West Meon, it cannot be accepted as sound after the troops were clear of West Meon; and indeed without any further instructions the General Officer Commanding the Northern force diverted later the Mounted Infantry and scouts) and Mounted Infantry up the lane running parallel half a mile to the Westward of that used, or up a chase-way near Sour down farm to the hill marked 611. This would have cleared the track for the Infantry and Artillery. If the advance had been less hurried these tracks would, perhaps, not have been overlooked.

When, however, the Mounted Infantry was engaged, it would have been more useful if it had been employed on the immediate flank of its opponent, and in any case a movement two miles to the Eastward to Wether down was an error, inasmuch as the enemy was said in the General Idea to be advancing from the Westward, and the roads leading up to Teglease from the Westward were to be seized as soon as possible.

The squadron of the Western force was well handled, showing marked improvement as compared with its work on the 11th September. The reports sent in were accurate, but were in some cases wanting in details.

The Northern Cavalry towards the close of the engagement having dismounted a troop to resort to fire action found, on retiring, a company of the Western force between it and the horses, all of which on service must have been captured. Greater latitude might with advantage have been given to the squadron, which was retained as escort to guns. These were unable from the nature of the ground to leave the Infantry engaged at the same spot.

The battalion of the Western force in action on Old Winchester hill claimed to have done considerable execution on the battery of the Northern force at which it fired for three-quarters of an hour. The Umpires, however, checked the sights used by the men, which were for 800 yards, and the distance is 1100 yards.

An enterprising attack was undertaken in the fog by the Northern leading brigade on the enemy's leading battery, which was, however, supported in time.

Although it is undesirable that Staff Officers should interfere with the Regimental Officers commanding their men, a Staff Officer should ensure the general direction is maintained.

WEST MEON, 15th September, 1891.

By order,

J. ALLEYNE, COLONEL,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

PRINTED AT THE FIELD PRINTING OFFICE, HEAD-QUARTERS, WEST MEON.



AUTUMN MANŒUVRES, 1891.

Narrative of and Remarks on Minor Operations of the 15th September.

GENERAL IDEA.

An Invading army retreating from Basingstoke to the South coast is threatened by the advance of a Defending army moving from Romsey.

SPECIAL IDEA—ADVANCING FORCE.

A squadron of Yeomanry moving from Romsey having been ordered to reconnoitre the river Meon between Corhampton and Soberton, arrives at 11 a.m. on the 14th September at the Workhouse, Droxford. The officer in command there receives the following instructions:—

“Reconnoitre all the roads and tracks from Meonstoke-Harvestgate farm on the North, to Soberton-Wallopswood farm on the South, both roads inclusive. Report in writing to a Staff Officer, who will wait at Droxford, if there is any enemy in your front. Do not risk serious loss until you are satisfied as to the number opposed to you. If it is inconsiderable endeavour to obtain possession of the junction of the roads North of Sheardley lane by 1-30 p.m.”

N.B.—Before the squadron moves all orders affecting the men relative to damages will be read on parade, and the Rules for the Conduct of Field Manœuvres so far as they affect the men. No one is to be East of the river at 11 a.m.

SPECIAL IDEA—RETREATING FORCE.

After sunset on the 13th September half a battalion of Mounted Infantry was moving Westward to watch the crossings over the river from Corhampton to Soberton, inclusive, but being fired on before the river was reached, the officer in command received instructions to take up an outpost line from Harvestgate farm by Bushydown farm to the Soberton road three-quarters of a mile to the South of the farm. Before daylight on the 14th September he received the following orders:—

“Watch all the roads and tracks to the river on the four roads across which you are posted. Do not provoke an engagement, but if attacked endeavour to concentrate in any position which will enable you to defend the junction of the roads at the North end of Sheardley lane until 1-30 p.m.”

N.B.—The outpost line is to be taken up by 11 a.m. at which hour no one is to be West of a North and South line drawn through Harvestgate and Bushydown farms.

To avoid confusion between the outpost line and troops engaged in other operations, the hour 11 a.m. is set instead of 6 a.m.

At 11 a.m. the opposing forces were in their assigned positions.

Three companies of the Mounted Infantry were posted as follows:—One at Harvestgate farm and the cross roads 448 (Manœuvre map) on the right, one at the triangular wood in the centre, and one in the vicinity of Bushydown Farm.

The Officer Commanding the Squadron of Yeomanry, dividing it into two parties, advanced towards the outpost line. One of the posts of Mounted Infantry was retired by the Captain, from a misconception of his orders, but the Yeomanry, not being in sufficient force, could only follow for a short distance.

An attempt however was made, half-an-hour later, near the centre of the position, and then the squadron having been united on the Northern flank, attempted to advance until its progress was stopped by an overwhelming fire.

REMARKS.

The task given to the Squadron would have been beyond its power if it had been at its full strength, as the outpost line was well posted.

All the Officers observed the careful and intelligent manner in which the scouts preceding the parties of Yeomanry carried out their duties. The work was well done. The reports are all agreed by the officer commanding the squadron. The Lieutenant-General would have preferred to have received separate reports from the officer detached on the Northern flank.

West Meon, 15th September, 1891.

By order, J. ALLEYNE, COLONEL,
Assistant Adjutant-General.



AUTUMN MANŒUVRES, 1891.

Narrative of and Remarks on the Operations of the 16th September.

GENERAL IDEA.

An Invading army is moving from Havant on the Petersfield-Farnham road, and a Defending army is moving through Ropley in a South-Easterly direction.

SPECIAL IDEA—DEFENDING FORCE.

(Field Day Order and white badge).

A Division with a Yeomanry detachment, 2 Horse Artillery batteries, and 2 companies Mounted Infantry, having reached the Meon river late on the 15th inst. bivouaced about East Meon.

The General Officer Commanding receives at 6 a.m. the following orders:—

“ROPLEY, 4 a.m. September 16, 1891.

“Move when the men have breakfasted and prevent the enemy using the defile between Butser and War down. If you encounter him on the march act vigorously.”

N.B.—The troops are not free to move South of South Mill till 9-30 a.m.

All non-combatants and the baggage of both Divisions will move as neutrals on the East Meon-West Meon-Soberton road.

The enemy will be in Field Day Order.

SPECIAL IDEA—INVADING FORCE.

(Field Day Order).

The leading Division of the Invading force having been ordered to secure the Petersfield defile before the columns attempt to pass through it, leaves the Meon road at Blendworth in order to move through Clanfield on to the high ground.

The General Officer Commanding receives at Clanfield at 6 a.m. on the 16th inst. the following orders:—

From the General Officer Commanding at Havant,

To the General Officer Commanding Leading Division.

“HAVANT, 8 p.m. September 15, 1891.

“Ensure that my columns shall pass unmolested through the defile between Butser and War down to-morrow. I can support you if necessary on the high ground between Hyden and Butser hills by 1 p.m. One company Mounted Infantry is placed at your disposal.”

N.B.—At 9-30 a.m. the head of the 1st Division is at the cross-roads Clanfield village.

The enemy will wear a white shoulder badge.

All non-combatants and the baggage of both Divisions will move as neutrals on the East Meon-West Meon-Soberton road.

The Northern troops bivouaced in the Meon Valley, presumably close to the water supply. Immediately in their front and to the South the ground rises 300 ft. to the ridgeway, a distance of a mile-and-a-quarter, while Butser hill, 100 ft. higher, bears East South-East and is $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles distant. Havant, whence, according to the General Idea, the enemy was moving, bears South South-East. Four tracks run from the vicinity of South Mill to the ridgeway, generally in the direction South South-East. The country is enclosed by weak fences to within half-a-mile or less of the ridgeway, which is bounded on the South by Hyden and the adjoining woods, which with cultivation confine troops advancing from the South to the roadways until the ridge is reached.

The country over which the Invading force had to pass is thickly enclosed, Clanfield lying rather more than one-and-a-half miles from and 300 feet below the ridgeway. As the head of the column of route was not permitted to leave Clanfield until 9-30 a.m., if each force had moved directly towards the ridgeway the Northern force could have occupied all the Northern exits from the woods before the Southern force could reach them.

At the hours laid down in the Special Ideas the respective forces marched in the following order:—The Invading column, leaving Clanfield cross-roads at 9-30 a.m., moved one squadron, one company Mounted Infantry, one battalion of Infantry brigade, one Brigade Division Field Artillery, and the three battalions of above-mentioned Infantry Brigade, by Lowton copse to the ridgeway. A second Infantry Brigade moved in support of the first, one half by the lane East of Lowton and the other half by the next chaseway to the East of the last mentioned route.

At 9-40 a.m. the General Officer in command of the Southern force perceived some Artillery crossing his front, apparently from West to East. He at once diverted his Artillery to the Eastward to Oxenbourne down. Meanwhile the Northern force was moving to the ridgeway in accordance with the following orders:—Two companies of Mounted Infantry and one troop of Cavalry from New Barn; one battalion, two Field Batteries, and three battalions from Twentyways farm and Ramsdean down; a third column of half a troop Cavalry, one brigade, one battery, and one company Royal Engineers, from East Meon to Roman camp; and a fourth column, half a troop of Hussars, the Yeomanry, and two Horse Batteries, from Stonylands farm to 739 on ridgeway.

Although the Special Idea ordered that the men should move as soon as they had breakfasted, yet the whole force was spread out on an East and West line drawn through South Mill. This formation was apparently chosen in order to place the greater part of the force nearer to Butser hill at the hour at which the operations might commence. It was not in accordance with the spirit of the instructions, which laid down that the force was to move as soon as the men had breakfasted, and troops cannot breakfast between two and three miles away from the water supply.

in the 2nd Division on the 17th September.

SPECIAL IDEA—SOUTHERN FORCE.
One squadron Hussars.
One battery Field Artillery.
Six battalions Infantry.

Mr. B.—Rendezvous at Park House at 8 a.m.
No troops to move off the boundary road until that hour, and no men of your force to go west of road running South-West and North-East through Westend Farm and 325.

From Officer Commanding, Alton,
To Officer Commanding, Teglease Farm.

Leglease Farm was prepared for defense, and shelter trenches made in selected areas during the early hours of the morning. The Southern Division was in the escort. Leglease Farm was prepared for defense, and shelter trenches made in selected areas during the early hours of the morning. The Southern Division was in the escort.

The left brigade followed the East side of Leydean Bottom. The battery remaining just South of Chidden was detached to attack Chidden down in front, the battery remaining just South of Chidden attacked Chidden down and drove back the

REMARKS.

It is a mistake to place the Special Ideas as to the position of the northern force, and the tendency of those dispositions was with the Special Ideas, as they would naturally have resulted in driving the Commanding Southern force should have utilized his battery to support the

The heavy attack on Teglease Farm was well carried out, but at heavy cost, owing to the Northern Artillery, which was not hampered by any action on the part of the Southern Artillery.

There is a tendency to open fire at unimportant objectives and waste by firing into a wood instead of waiting for the enemy to march into the open. There is a tendency to open fire at unimportant objectives and waste by firing into a wood instead of waiting for the enemy to march into the open.

W. F. SEYMOUR, MAJOR-GENERAL,
Commanding 2nd Division and Chief Engineer

RECEIVED AT THE FIELD PRINTING OFFICE, HEAD-QUARTERS WEST MEON.

Time taken to find range in yards	Object.	Measured

1	50	1060	Rank of column of enemys Infantry in Towns
2	10	1200	
			1215
			15

CHAS. M. CLARKE, MAJOR-GENERAL,
Commanding 1st Division and Chief Empire.